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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
         John Voigt appeals from a judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered by the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  The conviction arises from Voigt's role as the mastermind 
of a pernicious "advance fee" scheme whereby Voigt, operating under 
the auspices of the Euro-American Money Fund Trust, would obtain 
substantial fees in advance from, respectively, unsuspecting loan 
applicants and potential investors for various loans and 
investments that never materialized.  Over a three-year period the 
Trust took in a total of 18.5 million dollars. 
         Of Voigt's eight assignments of error, two significant 
constitutional questions are presented for our review.  The first 
is whether the government's use of acquitted codefendant Mercedes 
Travis, who Voigt alleges was counsel to the Trust and to him 
personally, as a confidential informant against him constitutes 
"outrageous government conduct" in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause.  The second is whether the district 
court violated Voigt's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice 
when, citing potential conflicts, it disqualified a third attorney 
Voigt sought to add to his defense team without holding a formal 
evidentiary hearing.  We also confront several questions of first 
impression in this Circuit pertaining to the money laundering 
statute, 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1), and its forfeiture counterpart.  
Id.  982.  We must decide whether those statutes require formal 
"tracing" where laundered funds have been commingled in a bank 
account with untainted funds.  We also must determine what is the 
proper burden of persuasion for forfeiture proceedings under 18 
U.S.C.  982, a question we have addressed previously in two other 
contexts.  See United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(RICO; reasonable doubt); see also United States v. Sandini, 816 
F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987) (CCE; preponderance).  Finally, Voigt 
contests the legal sufficiency of his convictions for tax evasion 
under 26 U.S.C.  7201, and challenges the orders of the district 
court requiring him to make restitution in the amount of $7,040,000 
and refusing to grant his motions for severance. 
         For the reasons we set forth below, we will affirm 
Voigt's conspiracy, money laundering and tax evasion convictions, 
along with the order of restitution, in all respects.  We will 
vacate the judgment insofar as it incorporates an erroneous order 
of forfeiture and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                I. 
THE FACTS 
         John Voigt was the mastermind of a scheme to defraud loan 
applicants and potential investors by inducing them to pay 
substantial "advance fees" for nonexistent loans and investments.  
To implement this scheme, Voigt created two fraudulent entities: 
Euro-American Money Fund Trust, and Meta Trading and Financial 
International [hereinafter collectively referred to as "the 
Trust"].  Voigt fabricated a fictitious genealogy for the Trust, 
claiming that it was a long-established European financial 
institution affiliated with the Catholic Church and the Knights of 
Malta and that it had access to billions of dollars.  Voigt also 
falsely claimed that the Trust's headquarters was located in Paris, 
France, and that he was the U.S. Director.  To facilitate the 
scheme Voigt used various aliases and required loan applicants to 
fill out bizarre confidentiality agreements that purported to bar 
customers from disclosing information about the Trust in this life 
and the afterlife. 
         The scheme operated from early 1990 until mid-1993.  
Brokers for the Trust recounted the false genealogy Voigt had 
concocted to unsuspecting victims.  At first, the Trust marketed 
only "loans."  These multi-million dollar loans were supposedly 
self-liquidating, which meant that, in return for a fee that ranged 
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, customers would receive 
a loan that they did not have to repay.  As soon as the fees were 
received they were distributed among the coconspirators.  
Eventually, the Trust began to market "Master Collateral 
Commitments" ("MCCs"), bogus financial instruments that were touted 
as special promissory notes issued by banks and available only 
through the Trust.  They were marketed to unsuspecting investors 
for 3.5-4.5 million dollars with the representation that they 
eventually would yield hundreds of millions of dollars.  All told, 
Voigt's three-year gain from marketing self-liquidating loans and 
MCCs was approximately seven and one-half million dollars. 
         On December 13, 1993, Voigt and four alleged 
coconspirators--Skip Alevy, Mercedes Travis, Ralph Anderskow, and 
Donald Anchors--were charged in a twenty-eight-count superseding 
indictment.  The indictment charged Voigt personally with one count 
of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, fifteen counts of wire fraud, 
four counts of money laundering, two counts of tax evasion, and 
criminal forfeiture allegations arising out of the money laundering 
counts.  After a three-month trial, a jury convicted Voigt of all 
counts except one count of wire fraud.  After a nonjury proceeding 
at which the district court ordered forfeiture of certain 
automobiles and pieces of jewelry, the court sentenced Voigt to a 
term of imprisonment of 188 months and ordered him to make 
$7,040,000 in restitution.  This appeal followed. 
         Voigt challenges the judgment against him on eight 
grounds.  He argues that: (1) the government's use of his alleged 
attorney, Mercedes Travis, as an informant violated his Fifth 
Amendment due process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel; (2) the district court erred in 
disqualifying one of his attorneys due to a potential conflict of 
interest without first making sufficient findings of fact, in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; (3) 
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on money- 
laundering counts twenty-five and twenty-six; (4) the forfeiture 
order should be vacated because the district court failed to 
require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
forfeited items were "traceable to" laundered money; (5) his 
convictions on the tax evasion counts should be vacated because the 
government failed to prove an affirmative act of evasion as 
required by statute; (6) the district court erred in imposing an 
order of restitution without making findings of fact regarding his 
ability to pay; (7) the district court should have granted his 
motion for a severance because his co-defendants asserted defenses 
antagonistic to his own; and (8) the district court erred in 
increasing his Guidelines offense level by two points for 
obstruction of justice. 
                               II. 
                           JURISDICTION 
         The district court had original jurisdiction over this 
criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment of conviction 
under 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
                               III. 
                  OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 
         Voigt argues that the government infringed his Fifth 
Amendment right to due process by recruiting his attorney as a 
government informant "in deliberate and flagrant disregard for the 
attorney-client relationship."  Voigt's Br. at 10.  The premise of 
this claim is that codefendant Mercedes Travis, with whom the 
government had extensive investigative contacts, was his personal 
attorney during the time of the investigation.  The precise nature 
of Travis' relationship with Voigt and with the government, 
however, is in dispute. 
                                A. 
         The relevant facts are as follows.  Mercedes Travis began 
working for the Trust in August, 1990.  Voigt contends that she was 
engaged as an attorney at that time, and points to an engagement 
letter that supports his claim.  The government, however, maintains 
that it justly and reasonably believed that Travis was not and had 
never been an attorney for the Trust.  In any event, by Travis' own 
account, she became concerned about the legitimacy of the Trust and 
feared that she herself was being defrauded.  As a result, she left 
her post in Europe and approached the FBI with her concerns.  In 
June and July, 1991, she met with Special Agent Alvin Powell and 
voluntarily provided him with a package of relevant documents. 
Those documents indicated that the Trust was engaged in a fraud.   
         Over the course of a three-day interview at a New Jersey  
motel in mid-July of 1991, Travis detailed the fraud for Powell.  
Noting that Travis was an attorney, and having seen a letter on 
Trust letterhead purporting to appoint Travis as attorney for the 
Trust, Powell asked Travis whether she had acted in a legal 
capacity for the Trust.  Travis indicated on several occasions that 
she had not acted as a legal representative for the Trust but, 
rather, that she had been primarily responsible for initiating and 
maintaining contacts with banks.  Travis also insisted that the 
letter purporting to appoint her as an attorney for the Trust was 
false. 
         Travis indicated that she went to work for the Trust in 
1990, first in the U.S. and later in Europe, believing it to be a 
bona fide financial institution.  Over time, however, she 
discovered that, notwithstanding Voigt's contention that the Trust 
possessed $75 billion in assets, the Trust was simply a shell 
corporation with few assets.  Travis then related that the Trust 
was engaged in an advance-fee scheme for loans in which fees were 
paid but no loan was ever funded.  Based on Travis' allegations, 
and on Powell's belief that she had not represented the Trust or 
its members in a legal capacity, Powell enlisted the assistance of 
Travis.  Powell devised a pretext whereby Travis would reingratiate 
herself with the Trust by falsely informing Voigt that she had 
negotiated an MCC.  Powell hoped that this would lead Voigt to 
divulge further information about the Trust's activities.  Powell 
eventually had Travis officially designated as a "cooperating 
witness" on the FBI's records. 
         Having enlisted Travis as an informant, Powell asked her 
to sign a document allowing the consensual recording of her 
conversations with Trust members, including Voigt.  In that 
document, however, Powell carefully noted that the purpose of the 
recordings was to corroborate her statements, based on the 
understanding that she had not acted, and would not act, as an 
attorney for the Trust or any of its members.  In September of 
1991, Travis made three supervised calls from the FBI office in New 
Jersey, although apparently none involved Voigt or his 
coconspirators. 
         In October of 1991, Travis informed Powell that she had 
been invited to Europe by someone associated with the Trust.  
Powell asked her to maintain contact with him, and she called once 
during her trip to inform Powell that she had met with Voigt, but 
that they had discussed only personal matters.  When Travis 
returned from Europe, Powell met her in an Atlantic City hotel, 
where she provided him with several cassette recordings of 
conversations, documents obtained during the trip, and information 
acquired by talking with Voigt.  Travis was still convinced that 
the Trust was engaged in a fraud.  According to Powell's version of 
the meeting, Travis indicated that she had not performed legal work 
for the Trust or Voigt during her trip to Europe. 
         In February of 1992, Travis informed Powell that she had 
prepared a tax opinion for Voigt.  She claimed it was a "one-shot 
deal," and that it concerned Voigt and not the Trust, but she did 
not share the substance of the opinion with Powell.  Powell had no 
prior knowledge that Travis would be providing legal advice to 
Voigt.  In March of 1992, Travis advised Powell that she had 
persuaded Voigt to let her become the Trust's attorney, but that 
her role would be to facilitate communications between the Trust 
and other entities.  Powell became concerned about this latest 
development because of potential attorney-client privilege problems 
and because Travis herself might become an active participant in 
what she had insisted was a fraud.  He therefore instructed Travis 
to meet with Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Paul Zoubek, 
who was supervising the investigation.  Travis replied that she 
would inform Powell if her status changed from facilitating loans 
and investments to providing legal advice.  Travis next called 
Powell on March 10 to inform him that she indeed had been appointed 
as attorney for the Trust.  Powell again warned her about acting in 
a legal capacity and warned her not to engage in any illegal 
activity.  He also gave her a firm date for their meeting with AUSA 
Zoubek.  In another telephone call two days later, Powell again 
instructed Travis not to act as an attorney, and she reassured 
Powell that the information she was providing raised no issue of 
privilege. 
         On March 25, 1992, Travis and Powell met with AUSA Zoubek 
at the U.S. Attorney's Office in Newark.  After listening to Travis 
recount her version of the events, AUSA Zoubek pointed out the 
stark inconsistency between her original allegation that the Trust 
was a fraud and her recent decision to rejoin the Trust as its 
attorney.  Travis indicated that she wanted to determine for 
herself whether in fact the Trust was legitimate and would inform 
the government of her findings within two weeks.  AUSA Zoubek 
nevertheless told her that she would be on her own, and that any 
time spent in Europe working for the Trust would not be as a 
government informant due to potential privilege problems.  
According to Zoubek, as verified by Powell's notes of the meeting, 
the only way that information otherwise privileged could be 
provided to the government would be if the crime-fraud exception 
were deemed to be applicable.  Travis indicated that she 
understood.  At the same time, however, Powell instructed Travis to 
report to him as to whether the Trust had sufficient funds to cover 
its existing loan commitments. 
         From the time of their last meeting on March 25, 1992, 
until May 1, 1992, Powell did not hear from Travis, but received 
information indicating that she was participating in the same type 
of fraudulent conduct that originally had motivated her to come 
forward to the FBI.  On May 1, 1992, Travis made two separate calls 
to Powell from Europe.  Her first call, which Powell maintained was 
unsolicited, was from a pay phone because, according to Travis, she 
was afraid her calls were being monitored.  Travis again told 
Powell that the Trust had no funds to lend, and that she would make 
her "official" call later that day.  In her second call, Travis 
indicated that she was representing Voigt in connection with two 
grand jury subpoenas for records of the Trust that Powell had 
served on Voigt.  At trial, however, Travis testified that at that 
point she was representing only the Trust, and that attorney James 
Binns was representing the Trust and its directors for purposes of 
the criminal investigation.  Powell advised Travis that she and 
Voigt should appear at the FBI office to discuss the matter.  It 
was not until sometime after this May 1 call from Travis that 
Powell had Travis officially taken off the books as a confidential 
informant. 
         Travis did not contact the government again until 
September of 1992, when Travis called AUSA Robert Ernst (who had 
taken over the investigation) to discuss grand jury subpoenas that 
had been served on the Trust in August.  Travis informed Ernst that 
she was representing the Trust in connection with the subpoenas.  
Before any further discussion occurred, Ernst informed Travis that 
she was a target of the investigation and, given her earlier 
contacts with the government, that she had a conflict of interest 
and should withdraw as counsel for the Trust.  AUSA Ernst 
documented this admonition in a letter sent to Travis eight days 
later. 
         On November 6, 1992, Travis again made an unsolicited 
call to Powell, warning him that an unsuspecting potential customer 
was about to transfer $21 million to the Trust and asking him to 
stop the transaction.  In response to a question by Powell, Travis 
indicated that she was not represented by counsel.  After 
reiterating that Travis was a target, Powell asked Travis whether 
she would appear voluntarily before a federal grand jury.  Travis 
agreed to testify.  After Travis had arrived in Newark, but prior 
to her grand jury testimony, she met with Powell and AUSA Ernst.  
Ernst repeated that Travis was a target, and informed her of her 
rights.  Ernst warned Travis not to disclose any confidences 
between her and any person affiliated with the Trust because of 
potential attorney-client privilege issues, and stated that he 
would not ask any questions that would risk eliciting potentially 
privileged information.  In fact, when Travis indicated that she 
had brought Trust documents with her to turn over to the 
government, Ernst refused to examine them.  Notwithstanding Travis' 
insistence that the documents were not privileged because the Trust 
did not actually exist, Ernst turned them over to an AUSA who was 
not part of the investigation into the Trust to make an independent 
privilege determination. 
         Before the grand jury, Travis again was informed of her 
rights and that she was a target of the investigation.  She was 
again admonished not to disclose privileged information, and when 
it appeared that she was about to do so, Ernst instructed her not 
to answer.  On January 12, 1993, Ernst wrote to Travis informing 
her once more that she was a target of the grand jury's 
investigation and invited her to provide additional testimony or 
evidence in her own behalf, which she did on January 15, 1993. 
                                B. 
         Contending that the government's reliance on Travis to 
build a case against him constitutes "outrageous government 
conduct" in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 
Voigt moved pretrial to dismiss the indictment.  The district court 
declined to hold an independent evidentiary hearing because it 
determined that Voigt had failed to make a prima facie showing of 
outrageousness and the trial would address the issues raised by his 
motion.  The district court ultimately denied Voigt's renewed 
posttrial motion to dismiss the indictment: 
         [A]s far as outrageous conduct by the 
         Government, I certainly can't find that here.  
         I have had the benefit of seeing Agent Powell 
         testify, I have seen Mercedes Travis testify 
         and the cross examination of both of them, and 
         I can't find that that was the case. 
 
              To the extent there is any conflict 
         between the testimony of Powell and Travis, I 
         credit the testimony of Powell . . . because 
         Powell convinced me that the Government was 
         acting reasonably based upon what Travis had 
         told them when they went forward, even though 
         she was an attorney, that she was not acting 
         as an attorney.  I can't find any outrageous 
         conduct whatsoever here and, of course, we 
         know later, Travis was not a Government agent, 
         [and] was really acting on her own at the 
         time.  I can't see any outrageous conduct 
         whatsoever and I have had the benefit of the 
         full trial hearing on this. 
 
App. at 1122-23. 
         Our standard of review is mixed.  When the district court 
decides a constitutional claim based on a developed factual record, 
we exercise plenary review of the district court's legal 
conclusion.  United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84, 85 (3d Cir. 
1988).  We defer to the factual findings supporting that conclusion 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  United States v. Bonanno, 852 
F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1016, 109 S. Ct. 
812 (1989).  
 
                                1. 
         In 1952 the Supreme Court recognized that outrageous 
misconduct by law enforcement officers in detecting and obtaining 
incriminating evidence could rise to the level of a due process 
violation.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 
(1952) (vacating conviction and dismissing indictment where police 
had pumped stomach of suspected drug pusher to obtain incriminating 
evidence).  Since Rochin was decided the Court has discussed the 
viability of an outrageous government conduct claim only in the 
context of government instigation of and overinvolvement in the 
very criminal activity it seeks to punish.  See United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637 (1973); see also Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976) (five Justices 
reaffirm viability of due process claim for government 
overinvolvement in crime).  In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 
727, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980), however, the Court discussed, in 
dictum, whether an illegal search of a third party's briefcase 
might constitute outrageous government conduct.  Id. at 737 n.9, 
100 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9.  Thus, we have no reason to doubt that the 
Court continues to recognize a due process claim premised upon 
outrageous law enforcement investigative techniques. 
         The showing required to establish a due process 
violation, though often recited, is by no means pellucid.  Writing 
for the Court in Rochin, Justice Frankfurter said that "the 
proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or sentimentalism about 
combatting crime too energetically.  This is conduct that shocks 
the conscience."  Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. at 209.  In 
Russell, the Court elaborated on the standard it had enunciated in 
Rochin: 
              While we may some day be presented with a 
         situation in which the conduct of law 
         enforcement agents is so outrageous that due 
         process principles would absolutely bar the 
         government from invoking judicial processes to 
         obtain a conviction, the instant case is 
         distinctly not of that breed. . . . The law 
         enforcement conduct here stops far short of 
         violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking 
         to the universal sense of justice," mandated 
         by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
         Amendment. 
 
Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, 93 S. Ct. at 1643 (citation omitted).  
And in Hampton, the Court's most recent opportunity to visit the 
outrageous government conduct issue, Justice Powell, concurring in 
the judgment, noted that "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime would 
have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it 
could bar conviction."  Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7, 96 S. Ct. 
1653 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
         We have also noted that the judiciary is extremely 
hesitant to find law enforcement conduct so offensive that it 
violates the Due Process Clause.  In United States v. Janotti, 673 
F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S. 
Ct. 2906 (1982), we observed that "the majority of the Court has 
manifestly reserved for the constitutional defense only the most 
intolerable government conduct."  Id. at 608 (emphasis added).  
Relying on well-settled separation-of-powers principles, we 
cautioned that 
         [w]e must necessarily exercise scrupulous 
         restraint before we denounce law enforcement 
         conduct as constitutionally unacceptable . . . 
         . Unless the behavior of the F.B.I. agents 
         rose to the level of outrageousness which 
         would bar conviction, the conduct of agents of 
         the executive branch who must protect the 
         public from crime is more appropriately 
         considered through the political process where 
         divergent views can be expressed in the ballot 
         box. 
 
Id. at 607, 609. 
         Subsequent decisions have heeded Janotti's call for 
judicial restraint.  As a result, the doctrine of outrageous 
government misconduct, although often invoked by defendants, is 
rarely applied by courts.  See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 
4 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The banner of outrageous misconduct is often 
raised but seldom saluted.").  Although litigants continue to 
assert the doctrine as a defense against conviction, "courts have 
rejected its application with almost monotonous regularity."  Id.at 4 
(collecting cases).  Indeed, the doctrine has only once been 
applied by a federal appellate court since the Supreme Court's 
Hampton decision in 1976: in this court's decision in United States 
v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).  Since Twigg, however, "this 
court and other appellate courts have . . . exercised extreme 
caution in finding due process violations in undercover settings."  
United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 945 n.6 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 
479 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 98 (1986).  See United States v. 
DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 1544 (1994). 
                                2. 
         Bearing in mind the amount of restraint we must exercise 
in subjecting law enforcement conduct to judicial review, we must 
determine whether, as a matter of law, the conduct that Voigt 
alleges occurred in this case raises a cognizable claim of 
outrageous government conduct.  Despite the paucity of directly 
relevant authority, we are not writing on a clean slate.  Our 
review of the case law demonstrates that a claim of outrageous 
government conduct premised upon deliberate intrusion into the 
attorney-client relationship will be cognizable where the defendant 
can point to actual and substantial prejudice. 
         In United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987), for example, the 
government used a defense attorney as an informant against the 
defendant in a matter unrelated to the subject of the attorney's 
representation (a drug prosecution).  With the attorney's 
permission, the government placed a body bug on him to record 
conversations with the defendant.  Despite strict instructions to 
the attorney not to elicit privileged information, secret defense 
strategy concerning Ofshe's drug prosecution was recorded by 
government agents.  Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit concluded 
that this government misconduct was not so outrageous as to violate 
the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 1516.  This conclusion was based on 
two findings: (1) that the attorney's cooperation concerned a 
different crime from the one for which he was representing the 
defendant, thus the invasion of the attorney-client relationship 
did not produce any evidence against the defendant; and (2) that 
the defendant was not prejudiced in his defense because the 
attorney's cocounsel continued to provide zealous representation to 
the defendant throughout the trial.  Id.  The court noted, however, 
that "[h]ad there been demonstrable evidence of prejudice, we would 
be compelled to reverse."  Id.  Accord United States ex rel. 
Shiflet v. Lane, 815 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissal not 
warranted where disclosure of privileged information to police lead 
to discovery of crucial evidence against defendant because 
government played no role in the breach of the privilege), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 965, 108 S. Ct. 1234 (1988); cf. United States v. 
Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissal of indictment on Sixth 
Amendment grounds warranted where government employs codefendant as 
confidential informant in order to obtain and reveal confidential 
defense strategy). 
         Only one decision has ordered that an indictment be 
dismissed due to preindictment intrusion into the attorney-client 
relationship so pervasive and prejudicial as to be considered 
"outrageous."  United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).  In Marshank, Ronald Minkin, the attorney for two 
cooperating defendants, provided information to the government 
leading to the indictment of another one of his clients.  Minkin 
then encouraged that client to cooperate with the government in 
order to secure an indictment against Marshank, with whom Minkin 
also had an ongoing attorney-client relationship.  The government 
never warned the attorney to avoid ethical impropriety, and 
affirmatively hid from both the court and the defendants the 
attorney's multiple, conflict-ridden representation while acting as 
a government informant.  Granting Marshank's motion to dismiss the 
indictment based on a due process violation for outrageous 
preindictment conduct, the district court distinguished between 
passive tolerance and active encouragement of impropriety: 
         [T]he government actively collaborated with 
         Ron Minkin to build a case against the 
         defendant, showing a complete lack of respect 
         for the constitutional rights of the defendant 
         and Minkin's other clients and an utter 
         disregard for the government's ethical 
         obligations. . . . [T]he agents and the 
         prosecutor here never warned Minkin not to 
         engage in unethical behavior and in fact 
         facilitated that behavior by hiding it from 
         the defendant.  Moreover, the government 
         colluded with Minkin to obtain an indictment 
         against the defendant, to arrest the 
         defendant, to ensure that Minkin would 
         represent the defendant despite his obvious 
         conflict of interest, and to guarantee the 
         defendant's cooperation with the government. 
 
Id. at 1524 (second emphasis added).   
                                C. 
                                1. 
         Voigt claims that, at the very least, the factual 
disputes raised by his moving papers and the government's response 
warranted an independent evidentiary hearing prior to trial, and 
that the district court's determination that he had failed to make 
out a prima facie showing of "outrageous government conduct" was 
erroneous.  The district court had before it: (1) Agent Powell's 
affidavit, to which contemporaneous notes of his contacts with 
Travis were attached as exhibits; (2) Voigt's affidavit, in which 
Voigt claimed that Travis had been the Trust's and his attorney 
from the summer of 1990 through June of 1993; (3) Travis' 
affidavit; and (4) Travis' and Powell's grand jury testimony.  
Although we agree with Voigt that conducting a hearing prior to 
trial would have been more prudent and the better practice, a 
remand is unnecessary under the facts of this case since we find 
that the record developed at trial, taken together with Voigt's 
moving papers and the government's response, provided the district 
court an adequate basis with which to resolve Voigt's 
constitutional claim. 
                                a. 
         Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that all "defects in the institution of the prosecution" 
be raised by pretrial motion.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1).  Although 
Rule 12 does not by its terms specify when such a motion entitles 
a defendant to a pretrial evidentiary hearing, we have held that a 
defendant's moving papers must demonstrate a "colorable claim" for 
relief.  United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(remanding for hearing where Brink alleged facts that, if true, 
"could violate a defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment").  
See United States v. Soberon, 929 F.2d 935, 941 (3d Cir.) (if 
district court had "reasonable suspicion" of prosecutorial 
misconduct proper course was to hold evidentiary hearing), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 818, 112 S. Ct. 73 (1991).  In order to be 
"colorable," a defendant's motion must consist of more than mere 
bald-faced allegations of misconduct.  United States v. Sophie, 900 
F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir.) ("A district court does not have to hold 
evidentiary hearing on a motion just because a party asks for 
one."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S. Ct. 124 (1990).  There 
must be issues of fact material to the resolution of the 
defendant's constitutional claim.  See United States v. Panitz, 907 
F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusal to hold evidentiary 
hearing on outrageousness claim proper because material facts were 
not in dispute); Sophie, 900 F.2d at 1071 (refusal to hold hearing 
proper where defendant's own submissions refuted his claim). 
         As our survey of the relevant case law indicates, see 
supra III.B.2, in order to raise a colorable claim of 
outrageousness pertaining to alleged governmental intrusion into 
the attorney-client relationship, the defendant's submissions must 
demonstrate an issue of fact as to each of the three following 
elements: (1) the government's objective awareness of an ongoing, 
personal attorney-client relationship between its informant and the 
defendant; (2) deliberate intrusion into that relationship; and 
(3) actual and substantial prejudice.  See Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1516; 
Lane, 815 F.2d at 466; United States v. Santopietro, 809 F. Supp. 
1008, 1015 (D. Conn. 1992) (no due process violation where 
defendant fails to demonstrate that attorney/informant revealed 
client confidences); Marshank, 777 F. Supp. at 1524.   
         Although the issue is a close one, after comparing 
Voigt's motion and Travis' affidavit with the government's 
response, we think the district court should have conducted an 
evidentiary hearing.  Travis' relationship with both Powell and 
Voigt was highly disputed.  Furthermore, Voigt's moving papers 
raised enough of a specter of ethical impropriety on the 
government's part to warrant closer scrutiny.  Even the district 
court, skeptical though it was as to the degree of purposeful 
intrusion, believed that whatever factual disputes existed on that 
issue would be resolved at trial.  This was an acknowledgement by 
the court that there were some disputed factual issues raised by 
Voigt's motion that needed to be resolved.  Since the government 
itself notes that suppression of evidence is a more appropriate 
remedy than dismissal of the indictment, factual determinations 
that can lead to suppression logically should be resolved at an 
evidentiary hearing conducted prior to trial. 
         Conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing certainly has 
its advantages.  The district court is then in a position to  
place in the record its findings of facts and conclusions of law,  
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e), which greatly facilitates appellate 
review.  Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d at 610.  This is especially true 
where the legal claim, outrageous government conduct, is so highly 
fact sensitive.  While we are not unmindful of the district court's 
strong interest in avoiding duplicative proceedings, judicial 
economy is not fostered when substituting trial testimony for a 
pretrial hearing generates postverdict and appellate litigation and 
potentially frustrates appellate review. 
                                b. 
         Nevertheless, any "error" arising from the district 
court's failure to hold an independent evidentiary hearing in this 
case is unquestionably harmless.  Most of the factual issues 
depended for their resolution on assessing Powell's and Travis' 
credibility.  In our view, their trial testimony, when taken 
together with Voigt's motion papers and the government's response, 
provided the district court with a sufficient evidentiary record 
against which to measure Voigt's outrageousness claim.  At trial, 
Voigt cross-examined Powell thoroughly about whether he in fact 
believed that Travis had acted in a legal capacity on behalf of the 
Trust or Voigt when she first approached the government.  Powell 
also was cross-examined extensively about the degree to which he 
encouraged Travis to reestablish contact with the Trust and whether 
it was his understanding that she would do so in her capacity as an 
attorney.  Travis testified in her own behalf and was cross- 
examined at length by the government as to her understanding of her 
relationship with Powell and her role as a confidential informant.  
Finally, during the trial the district court ruled on numerous 
claims of attorney-client privilege, which certainly provided it 
with insight into the nature and degree of any alleged government 
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.  Thus, the 
district court's failure to conduct a hearing, although ill- 
advised, was at worst harmless error. 
                                2. 
         Voigt claims, however, that even assuming the record as 
it now stands is sufficiently developed, and we determine that it 
is, the district court should have dismissed the indictment because 
the record unequivocally demonstrates outrageous government 
conduct.  Relying on the three-part test we set forth above, 
supraIII.C.1.a, we hold that Voigt's claim of outrageousness fails as a 
matter of law with respect to the period between July 13, 1991, and 
May 1, 1992, because Voigt failed to establish the first element-- 
the government's objective awareness of an attorney-client 
relationship between Travis and Voigt during that time.  We further 
agree with the district court's implicit determination that there 
is insufficient evidence in the record on the second and third 
elements, purposeful intrusion and prejudice, as to the period 
thereafter. 
                                a. 
         Voigt's claim of outrageousness based on the government's 
contacts with Travis during the period from July 13, 1991 (when 
Travis first approached the government), to May 1, 1992 (when 
Travis first announced that she was representing Voigt in response 
to the grand jury subpoenas), fails as a matter of law for two 
reasons.  First, the record is wholly devoid of any evidence that 
the government was or should have been aware of a personal 
attorney-client relationship between Travis and Voigt during that 
time.  Voigt argues that the tax opinion Travis prepared for him 
should have alerted Powell that by February or March of 1992 Travis 
had an ongoing personal attorney-client relationship with Voigt.  
According to Powell, however, Travis claimed that it was a "one- 
shot deal" and did not share the opinion with him.  The district 
court credited Powell's version of the events, and we find nothing 
in the record to indicate that the district court's finding in this 
respect was clearly erroneous.  In any event, the record clearly 
indicates that at about the same time Travis informed Powell of the 
tax opinion AUSA Zoubek discontinued Travis as a confidential 
informant. 
         Voigt also argues inferentially that the government's 
entire case at trial was based on the premise that the Trust was 
essentially his "alter ego."  Since the Trust was a fictitious 
entity, Voigt reasons, any legal work Travis performed for the 
Trust in reality must have been performed for him personally.  In 
this way Voigt attempts to bootstrap himself into an attorney- 
client relationship that is essential to the maintenance of his 
outrageousness claim, at least with respect to the period preceding 
May 1, 1992.  Voigt cannot have it both ways.  Having abused the 
corporate structure such that the Trust, in effect, became his 
"alter ego," we think that Voigt may not now rely on that abuse as 
a shield by claiming a personal attorney-client relationship with 
the attorney for the fraudulent corporate entity.  Moreover, far 
from creating additional protections for officers of fraudulent 
corporations, the "alter ego" doctrine exists to pierce the 
corporate veil, thereby stripping those officers of the protections 
normally associated with the corporate form.  See generally Charles 
Clark, Corporate Law  2.4, at 71 (1986). 
         In any event, even if Travis' status as an attorney for 
the Trust were relevant to our resolution of the outrageousness 
issue, the record fully supports the district court's implicit 
finding that Powell reasonably believed that Travis was not acting 
as counsel for the Trust during the period between July 13, 1991, 
and May 1, 1992.  Accordingly, any claim of outrageousness must be 
premised upon the government's contacts with Travis after May 1, 
1992, for that is the day Travis informed the government that she 
was representing the Trust and Voigt in connection with the very 
investigation in which she had acted as an informant. 
                                b. 
         As for Travis' contacts with the government from May 1, 
1992, until her indictment, the record falls woefully short of 
establishing the sort of purposeful intrusion into her attorney- 
client relationship with Voigt that would rise to the level of 
outrageousness.  For example, Travis made two phone calls to Powell 
on May 1 1992.  Contending that these calls were "staged" to 
maintain Travis' cover, Voigt asserts that they constitute proof of 
"purposeful intrusion."  We are not persuaded.  First, by the time 
Travis placed these calls to Powell, AUSA Zoubek had affirmatively 
cut off contact with Travis given her decision to rejoin the Trust 
as counsel.  This demonstrates the government's awareness of and 
sensitivity to Travis' ethical obligations and belies Voigt's 
sinister characterization.  Second, Powell asserted that he did 
nothing to solicit the calls, and the record supports his 
contention.  Thus, to the extent that Travis disclosed privileged 
information, and there is no proof that she did, it was not at the 
behest of government agents.  
         All of Travis' post-May 1, 1992, contacts with the 
government were unsolicited except for her appearances before the 
grand jury.  The government's actions during this period 
demonstrated sensitivity to potential ethical problems and 
contradicts Voigt's claim of "purposeful intrusion."  Illustrative 
of the government's sensitivity was Travis' call to AUSA Ernst in 
September of 1992.  Ernst did not attempt to extract information 
from Travis.  Instead, he informed her that she was a target of the 
investigation and admonished her to withdraw as counsel given her 
obvious conflict of interest.  Travis' next contact with the 
government was her unsolicited call to Powell in November of 1992 
to warn him about an impending fraud.  To the extent that such 
information was privileged, it was volunteered and cannot have 
constituted "deliberate intrusion" on the part of the government.  
Similarly, we find no impropriety in Powell's asking Travis to 
appear before the grand jury.  By this time Travis knew she was a 
target of the investigation and had been warned to withdraw as 
counsel for Voigt.  Therefore, to the extent Travis continued to 
provide legal advice to Voigt in connection with the criminal 
investigation, she was violating her ethical obligation to avoid a 
conflict of interest.  Finally, AUSA Ernst's efforts to steer clear 
of privileged information during Travis' grand jury testimony 
demonstrate that the government was attentive to ethical 
constraints.  We fail to see any purposeful intrusion on the 
government's part. 
         Voigt's alternative claim of purposeful intrusion, which 
arguably has some merit, might be that the government had an 
affirmative duty to inform him that Travis had acted as an 
informant when it discovered that she was representing him in 
connection with the very criminal investigation in which she had 
acted as an informant.  At least one court of appeals has 
speculated as to whether the government, during the investigative 
phase of a prosecution, may have some affirmative duty to inform a 
defendant of a potential conflict of interest caused by its prior 
association with the defendant's lawyer.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Lopez, 71 F.3d 954, 963-64 (1st Cir. 1995) (attorney for 
defendant had begun grand jury investigation into his client as 
AUSA before switching sides).  We need not reach that issue, 
however, because as our discussion in the next subsection 
indicates, Voigt has made no showing of prejudice. 
                                c. 
         We find no evidence in the record of significant 
prejudice--the third element of our outrageous government conduct 
test.  As the party bearing both the burden of production and 
persuasion on his outrageousness claim, Voigt has failed to 
demonstrate that he suffered any ill effects flowing from the 
government's allegedly improper investigative activity.  For 
instance, Voigt does not cite even a single occasion on which 
Travis gave him legal advice that was calculated to damage him to 
the benefit of the government.  Nor does he claim that Travis 
intentionally declined to assert the attorney-client privilege in 
response to the government's grand jury subpoenas or that Travis 
advised him to pursue a course of conduct she knew to be illegal 
simply to help the government build its case.  More significantly, 
however, Voigt failed to demonstrate that any of the information 
Travis provided the government after May 1, 1992, was in fact 
privileged.  We think this alone is fatal to his claim of 
outrageousness.  Voigt contends on appeal that he does not assail 
the district court's attorney-client privilege rulings because of 
the lenient standard of review we would apply.  But we think if 
Voigt's assertion that "the evidence introduced both prior to and 
at the trial included hundreds, if not thousands, of privileged 
attorney-client communications" (Voigt's Br. at 12) had any merit 
whatsoever, he would have pointed to at least one document Travis 
provided the government that was privileged.  By failing to meet 
his burden to establish the privilege he claims, Voigt has 
precluded us from finding that an attorney-client relationship 
between Travis and him ever existed, let alone that it was 
violated. 
         Finally, Voigt invokes our decision in Levy, 577 F.2d at 
200, along with other similar decisions, in an attempt to have us 
find that the government's intrusion into his attorney-client 
relationship, standing alone, is per se prejudicial.  Levy, 
however, is distinguishable on two fronts.  First, Levy was decided 
under the Sixth Amendment.  Second, and more importantly, Levy, 
like most of the cases that Voigt has cited, concerned the 
government's deliberate intrusion into a defendant's attorney- 
client relationship in order to gain access to confidential defense 
strategy.  See, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618 (6th 
Cir. 1976) (dismissal appropriate where government obtains defense 
strategy).  The record in this case demonstrates that the 
government was scrupulous in its effort to avoid procuring 
confidential defense strategy.  See generally Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 
1516 (no dismissal warranted where inadvertently intercepted 
defense strategy not used against the defendant).  If any 
privileged information was disclosed to the government in this 
case, it concerned the workings of the Trust, not Voigt's legal 
strategy in responding to the criminal investigation into his 
activities.  Voigt's claim of severe prejudice amounts to little 
more than an argument that "where there's smoke, there must be 
fire."  We find neither. 
                               IV. 
                    RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
         Voigt claims that the district court's disqualification 
of James Binns, a third attorney he sought to add to his defense 
team, violated his right to counsel of choice under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Voigt seeks per se reversal of his conviction on the 
theory that the manner in which the district court disqualified 
Binns was arbitrary. 
                                A. 
                                1. 
         The nature and extent of James Binns' relationship with 
the Trust, like that of Travis, is somewhat ambiguous and eludes 
precise definition.  An attorney who also was Voigt's long-time 
friend, Binns first came into contact with the Trust in April of 
1992 when he was contacted by Travis and Voigt in connection with 
the government's investigation into the Trust.  Shortly thereafter, 
he accompanied Voigt to the Linwood, New Jersey offices of the FBI 
and "attempted" to meet with Powell. 
         Binns then met with Anderskow regarding the grand jury 
subpoenas that had been served on him.  By Binns' own account, he 
told Anderskow that he would be acting as counsel for Voigt only, 
but would "facilitate the production of documents to the 
Government" in connection with Anderskow's subpoena.  In a June 
interview with the FBI, however, in response to the FBI's request 
to review certain documents, Anderskow apparently stated that Binns 
had been retained by the Trust and was representing Voigt, 
Anderskow, and any other Trust members who came under investigation 
regarding the activities of the Trust.  Binns was not present at 
Anderskow's interviews, nor did he have any contact with the FBI 
around that time. 
         In June of 1992, Travis and Binns spent five days 
together in a New Jersey hotel assembling documents responsive to 
grand jury subpoenas that had been served on Voigt and Anderskow 
that spring.  Travis asserted that "Binns was operating in the role 
of attorney for the Trust and its various members" at that time; 
Binns maintained that Travis was the attorney for Voigt, Anderskow, 
and the Trust, and that she withheld many documents from Binns on 
grounds of attorney-client privilege with respect to those parties. 
         Binns and Travis also worked together that weekend and 
periodically until November of 1992, to devise Voigt's defense 
strategy.  According to Binns, he advised Travis numerous times 
that as a potential target of the grand jury's investigation she 
should seek a criminal defense attorney to represent her.  Travis 
replied that she did not want an attorney and that she would 
represent herself.  
         On November 12, 1992, Binns sent a letter to AUSA Ernst 
that stated as follows: 
         Please be advised that for the limited purpose 
         of responding to outstanding subpoenas I am 
         representing . . . [the Trust], Ralph 
         Anderskow, John Voigt and Jack Dunn. 
 
App. at 56.  When Binns filed a notice of appearance in July of 
1993 indicating that he was joining Voigt's defense team, which 
already consisted of two privately retained attorneys, the 
government submitted a letter to the district court suggesting a 
potential conflict arising out of Binns' prior representation of 
the Trust and Anderskow during the investigative phase of the case 
and requesting a hearing.  The government also indicated that there 
was a possibility that Binns would be called to testify at trial 
since a potential victim of the Trust had been instructed to 
deposit his advance fee into Binns' escrow account. 
         Shortly thereafter, codefendant Mercedes Travis filed a 
formal motion to disqualify Binns.  She submitted an affidavit 
describing her professional interaction with Binns and his actions 
in representing the Trust and its members in response to government 
subpoenas.  She argued that when Binns formerly represented the 
Trust he "was loosely representing all members of the Trust," and 
that she had consulted with him numerous times when he was acting 
in that capacity, such that she was in effect a former client of 
his. 
         Travis also alleged that Binns might be in possession of 
certain documents or recordings material to her defense.  According 
to her affidavit, four boxes of her Trust documents and personal 
material had been shipped to Binns, but only two of those boxes 
were produced to the government.  The remaining boxes and their 
contents have not been seen since they were shipped from Geneva.  
Travis maintained that they are in Binns' possession and control.  
The only missing item that Travis mentioned specifically is a tape 
of a two-and-one-half-hour telephone conversation between Voigt, 
and Dunn and herself that she had surreptitiously recorded in March 
of 1992.  Travis stated that she phoned and faxed Binns repeatedly 
in an effort to recover her papers and this tape in particular, but 
Binns did not respond.  Travis asserted this as a separate ground 
for Binns' disqualification, arguing that 
         it is possible in the defense of this matter 
         that I may need to have access to this tape or 
         documents or to account for their absence.  
         Mr. Binns may well have duties to his current 
         client not to provide access to this tape or 
         these documents.  Mr. Binns could conceivably 
         be the only witness available to me should it 
         be necessary for me to account for the absence 
         of the tape or the documents. 
 
Id. at 71. 
 
         In response to the government's letter and Travis' 
disqualification motion, Binns submitted a letter to the district 
court attempting to dispel any notion that his representation of 
Voigt at trial would raise a conflict problem.  First, Binns 
asserted that he never had an attorney-client relationship with 
Travis.  Binns claimed, therefore, that he could not have acquired 
any confidential information in the course of his association with 
Travis that would prejudice her defense.  Binns also disavowed any 
knowledge of the potential use of his escrow account in connection 
with a victim of the Trust.  Binns asserted that "[t]here is no 
possibility that anyone acting in good faith would call me as a 
fact witness at the trial of this case."  App. at 87.  Finally, 
Binns asserted that his alleged "representation" of codefendant 
Anderskow had been limited to facilitating the Trust's response to 
the government's subpoenas.  Binns also claimed that after 
Anderskow's meeting with the FBI, in which Anderskow had indicated 
that Binns was representing the Trust and its members, he made 
clear to Anderskow that he was representing only Voigt. 
         With respect to the documents, Binns offered the 
following account of the way in which they came into his possession 
and the manner in which he disposed of them: 
              In October, 1992 I received four (4) 
         boxes of documents from Jack Dunn.  He sent 
         them from Geneva, Switzerland.  Messrs. Voigt 
         and Dunn told me that they couldn't get 
         Mercedes Travis to either come to the United 
         States or send documents responsive to Agent 
         Powell's 2nd Grand Jury subpoena.  They told 
         me that she refused their repeated requests to 
         send the documents unless she was paid a 
         considerable sum of money. 
 
              When I received the boxes I did not open 
         them or look at the contents.  I asked Mr. 
         Voigt to come to my office to pick up the 
         boxes.  He said he wanted to produce 
         everything. . . .  Mr. Voigt produced all of 
         the documents to the Grand Jury.  According to 
         him, Ms. Travis withheld a number of documents 
         which she had in her possession. 
 
Id. at 86. 
                                2. 
         Before hearing oral argument on Travis' motion, the 
district court stated: 
         I must say that the record before me raises 
         great concern in my mind.  We have here 
         additional counsel.  My concern is if we allow 
         this additional counsel to participate, we may 
         wind [] up polluting an otherwise hopefully 
         error-free trial and creating issues of 
         conflict of interest, as well as the 
         possibility that this person who seeks to act 
         as an attorney is, in fact, a potential 
         witness. 
 
Id. at 190-91.  Binns then addressed the district court, 
essentially reiterating his reasons as to why the motion to 
disqualify should be denied, and offered to take the stand to 
repeat them under oath.  Attorneys for codefendants Anderskow and 
Anchors indicated their clients' willingness to waive any issue of 
conflict arising out of Binns' representation of Voigt.  Both the 
government and Travis reiterated why Binns should be disqualified. 
         The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing.  
Instead, relying on the affidavits and Binns' oral representations, 
the court decided to grant the disqualification motion: 
              We have here a number of very serious 
         issues.  As a matter of fact, I would 
         characterize it really as a foaming caldron of 
         representation issues here.  Such that I am 
         convinced that it would be foolhardy for me to 
         go forward and inject potential error and 
         possible violation of the rights of 
         codefendants in what purports to be a lengthy 
         and complicated criminal case right at its 
         inception before we have even heard any 
         motions. 
 
              . . . . 
 
              . . . Mr. Binns has had substantial 
         involvement in pre-indictment events 
         concerning the case.  I don't need to pass on 
         his credibility versus Ms. Travis's 
         credibility or to the extent that Mr. 
         Anderskow did or did not authorize his 
         representation.  We have a letter that he 
         represented him for a limited purpose.  We 
         have Mr. Anderskow, according to counsel's 
         submission, saying that he thought Mr. Binns 
         was going to represent him and later saying 
         that he didn't.  While Mr. Anderskow certainly 
         can waive any conflict, the waiver would have 
         to be knowing and voluntary, and we'll get 
         into that a bit later. 
 
              And certainly Ms. Travis doesn't waive 
         any issue here. . . . 
 
              And I am convinced, based upon the 
         precedent, that it would be very foolish for 
         me to proceed and to allow [Binns to represent 
         Voigt]. . . . [T]o allow him to come into 
         court and cross-examine other persons based 
         upon his personal knowledge, possibly to 
         examine persons as to whom he has represented 
         beforehand, whether directly or otherwise, is 
         exactly the concern that the cases have 
         raised. 
 
Id. at 216-18.  The district court went on to note that it did not 
think that Anderskow's or Anchor's waiver could be considered 
knowing and voluntary at the beginning of a large multi-defendant, 
multi-count trial.  Binns ultimately was never called to testify at 
trial, although there were sporadic references to him during 
testimony. 
                                B. 
         The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."   U.S. Const. amend VI.  One 
element of this basic guarantee is the right to counsel of choice.  
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S. Ct. 55, 58 (1932).  The 
right to counsel of choice, however, is not absolute. Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).  Thus, where 
"considerations of judicial administration" supervene, the 
presumption in favor of counsel of choice is rebutted and the right 
must give way.  Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607 & n.3 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873, 110 S. Ct. 203 (1989). 
         Our decision in Fuller reveals that counsel of choice 
cases can further be divided into two categories.  The first and 
most common type of case involves "arbitrary" denials of the right 
to counsel.  Fuller, 868 F.2d at 604; United States v. Flanagan, 
679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982) (Sixth Amendment "goes no 
further than preventing arbitrary dismissal of the chosen 
attorney."), vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S. Ct. 
1051 (1984).  A disqualification of counsel of choice is arbitrary 
not because it is substantively "erroneous," but because it was the 
product of a failure to balance proper considerations of judicial 
administration against the right to counsel.  See Fuller, 868 F.2d 
at 604 (flat refusal to admit out-of-state attorneys pro hac vice); 
United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988) (summarily 
denying request for chosen counsel); United States v. Rankin, 779 
F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986) (summarily denying request for continuance 
that would permit defendant to retain chosen counsel); United 
States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1979) (failure to make 
findings essential to balancing required by Sixth Amendment).  
Under current circuit precedent, arbitrary denials of the right to 
counsel of choice mandate per se reversal.  Fuller, 868 F.2d at 
607-08 (citing Romano, 849 F.2d at 818, 820). 
         The second type of right to counsel of choice case 
concerns "a nonarbitrary, but erroneous denial."  Id. at 609 n.4.  
In these cases, as Fuller's dictum describes, "a trial court could 
make a reasoned determination on the basis of a fully prepared 
record (hence a nonarbitrary determination), but still err in 
concluding that counsel of choice should be denied."  Id.  Thus, 
although a trial court's disqualification decision may be 
substantively erroneous, it is nonarbitrary because the trial court 
engaged in the balancing required by the Sixth Amendment and 
developed the record necessary to do so.  Id.  This is an important 
distinction for two reasons.  First, and most importantly, 
Fullersuggested, albeit in dictum, that nonarbitrary-yet-erroneous 
denials of the right to counsel of choice might be subject to 
harmless error analysis, and noted that no Third Circuit case has 
decided that issue definitively.  Id.  Second, the standard of 
review may be different, for the question whether a 
disqualification is "arbitrary" is quite different from the 
question whether the disqualification was substantively unjustified 
under Wheat and its progeny. 
                                C. 
         Voigt claims that the district court failed to conduct 
the sort of inquiry required by our cases and, thus, that it 
arbitrarily violated his right to counsel of choice.  In the 
alternative, Voigt contends that even if nonarbitrary, the district 
court's disqualification decision constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
                                1. 
         Although two potential grounds for disqualification were 
raised in the district court (Binns' prior representation and his 
status as a potential witness), it appears that the court relied on 
only the former. 
                                a. 
         The district court's oral disqualification decision, 
which spanned four pages of transcript, indicates that the 
principal, if not the sole, basis for its decision was Binns' prior 
status as an attorney for the Trust, Anchors, Anderskow and, 
perhaps, Travis during the grand jury investigation.  See, e.g., 
App. at 218 ("[T]o allow him . . . possibly to examine persons as 
to whom he represented beforehand . . . is exactly the concern that 
the cases have raised.").  The court viewed this as raising the 
potential for serious conflicts.  Clearly, the potential for 
serious conflicts is a consideration of judicial administration 
that can outweigh a defendant's right to counsel of choice.  Wheat, 
486 U.S. at 163, 108 S. Ct. at 1699; United States v. Moscony, 927 
F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1211, 111 S. Ct. 
2812 (1991); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 1981).  
There is no question that the trial court performed the balancing 
required by our cases and considered a factor legitimately weighing 
against the right to counsel of choice. 
         Voigt contends that the district court's refusal to hold 
a separate evidentiary hearing renders the district court's 
disqualification of Binns per se arbitrary.  He relies on two 
authorities in support of his claim: Fuller, 868 F.2d at 604, and, 
to a lesser extent, United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 
1988). In Fuller, a defendant who was represented by in-state 
counsel filed a motion for admission of two out-of-state lawyers 
pro hac vice to represent him.  The state trial court denied the 
motion without holding a hearing or making particularized findings 
of fact, on the grounds that the local counsel was competent to try 
the case and that the admission of the two out-of-state attorneys 
would likely result in delays and administrative hassles.  868 F.2d 
at 605.  On appeal from the grant of Fuller's petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, this court held that "the trial court's wooden 
approach and its failure to make record-supported findings 
balancing the right to counsel with the demands of the 
administration of justice resulted in an arbitrary denial of 
Fuller's motion for counsel pro hac vice."  Id. at 611.  
         Contrary to Voigt's assertion, our decision in Fullerdoes not 
stand for the proposition that a trial court's denial of 
a defendant's chosen counsel must be based on a hearing and 
supported by factual findings in order to pass constitutional 
muster.  While we held in Fuller that a trial court may not deny a 
defendant's right to counsel of choice on the basis of 
generalizations alone, we took pains to clarify that "we d[id] not 
hold that a court is prohibited from using its 'instinct and 
judgment based on experience' when it weighs the competing rights 
of the litigant to counsel of his choice and wise judicial 
administration."  Id. (citation omitted).  As long as the court 
makes a "reasoned determination on the basis of a fully prepared 
record," its decision will not be deemed arbitrary.  868 F.2d at 
609 n.4. 
         Voigt also cites United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d at 
812, in support of his argument that the district court's failure 
to hold a hearing and make factual findings was reversible error.  
In Romano, a pro se defendant sought to reserve the right to select 
counsel of her choice in the event that the court found it 
necessary to have stand-by counsel take over.  The district court 
summarily denied her request, instead appointing stand-by counsel 
to back up defendant and potentially take over her defense.  This 
court ruled, as it did in Fuller, that the failure to conduct a 
hearing and make findings of fact as to the suitability of 
defendant's chosen counsel violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights and constituted reversible error.   
         Taken together, Fuller and Romano do no more than 
illustrate the well-established principle that a  trial court may 
not arbitrarily deny a defendant's right to counsel of choice.  
While in both of those cases the court's failure to hold a hearing 
or make factual findings was fatal, neither case establishes formal 
procedures that a court must follow in weighing a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of choice against the interests of the 
proper and fair administration of justice.  Rather, we found 
hearings and/or factual findings necessary in those cases because 
the district courts' determinations had no basis in fact or reason; 
the  trial court in Fuller denied the defendant's request for 
admission of counsel pro hac vice on the basis of generalizations 
and speculation, while the district court in Romano denied the 
defendant's request for no apparent reason at all.  Without some 
sort of fact finding or hearing, these determinations could only be 
considered arbitrary. 
         In determining whether to disqualify counsel on conflict 
of interest grounds, the district court need not find an actual, 
existing conflict of interest.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Wheat, the court 
         must recognize a presumption in favor of 
         petitioner's counsel of choice, but that 
         presumption may be overcome not only by a 
         demonstration of actual conflict but by a 
         showing of serious potential for conflict.  
         The evaluation of the facts and circumstances 
         of each case under this standard must be left 
         primarily to the informed judgment of the 
         trial court. 
 
486 U.S at 164, 108 S. Ct. at 1700.  Determining whether such a 
potential conflict exists is no simple task.  "The likelihood and 
dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to 
predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials."  
Id. at 162-63, 108 S. Ct. at 1699. 
         In this case, the district court heard oral argument, but 
did not hold an evidentiary hearing.  At the time of the argument, 
however, the court had before it the submissions of the various 
parties, including sworn affidavits and documentary evidence 
attached as exhibits.  This record was fairly substantial-- 
certainly far more so than anything that was before the courts in 
Fuller and Romano.  The government's eleven-page letter of August 
6, 1993, attached exhibits including: (1) correspondence between 
Binns and the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding whom he represents; 
(2) a memorandum and notes by Mercedes Travis regarding litigation 
strategies and mentioning Binns; and (3) communications with 
investors in the Trust directing them to contact Binns or deposit 
funds into his escrow account.  Travis' motion included a sworn 
affidavit setting forth her relationship with Binns.  Binns' 
letter to the court laid out his version of events in great detail 
and attached ninety-six pages of documentary support, including but 
not limited to affidavits, grand jury transcripts, correspondence 
to and from Binns, and FBI reports.  Indeed, Binns' letter and 
supporting documentation were so thorough that he told the court at 
the hearing, "in substance, you have the story.  The story is 
contained in my letter . . . ."  App. at 204.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that the record was more than sufficient 
to enable the district court to make a reasoned and well-informed 
decision.  Formal findings of fact are not required. 
                                b. 
         We agree with Voigt, however, that Binns' status as a 
potential witness, standing alone, cannot render the district 
court's disqualification order nonarbitrary.  Although Binns' 
status as a potential witness is certainly a proper consideration 
of judicial administration, Stamler, 650 F.2d 480-81, the record 
indicates that the decision to disqualify Binns was based primarily 
on his alleged prior representation of the Trust and its members.  
To be sure, the district court made passing reference to the 
possibility of Binns' becoming a witness at trial.  See App. at 
190-91.  Yet none of the reasons referred to by the district court 
in its final oral decision indicated that Binns' status as a 
potential witness was one of the "considerations of judicial 
administration" that weighed into its balancing.  Moreover, the 
record is devoid of any "findings" as to Binns' status as a 
potential witness that would have allowed the district court 
properly to weigh that consideration against Voigt's presumed right 
to counsel of choice (and allowed us to exercise appellate review). 
         The government's retort that "Voigt conspicuously fails 
to argue that the district court could not have made the necessary 
findings . . . .," Government's Br. at 34, is unsatisfactory in 
several respects.  First, it all but concedes that the district 
court failed to make any findings with respect to Binns' status as 
a potential witness.  Second, the government appears to make this 
argument in suggesting that the district court's disqualification 
was nonarbitrary.  But to be nonarbitrary, as we have noted, the 
district court actually must make findings based on evidence in the 
record and weigh those findings against the right to counsel.  
Permitting the government to argue that there was evidence in the 
record upon which the district court could have based findings that 
it concededly failed to make would simply inject a harmless error 
inquiry into the one area that our right to counsel of choice 
jurisprudence indicates is singularly inappropriate.  Therefore, 
since the district court failed to address adequately the 
likelihood that Binns would be called as a witness, record evidence 
concerning that potential is irrelevant to the "arbitrariness" 
question. 
         In any event, we have determined that the court had 
sufficient other evidence before it to suggest that 
disqualification was appropriate.  It specifically referred to that 
evidence in announcing its decision to disqualify Binns.  That is 
all our decisions prohibiting arbitrary denials of the right to 
counsel of choice require.  See, e.g., Fuller, 868 F.2d at 604; 
Romano, 849 F.2d at 812.  We therefore reject Voigt's claim that 
the district court arbitrarily denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice. 
                                2. 
         In the alternative, Voigt contends that the 
disqualification decision amounted to an abuse of discretion 
because it was unwarranted given the information before the 
district court.  We disagree.  In Wheat, 486 U.S. at 153, 108 S. 
Ct. at 1692, the Supreme Court considered the circumstances under 
which a trial court, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, could 
disqualify a defendant's chosen attorney.  Wheat involved an 
attorney's potential representation of several codefendants in the 
same trial.  Referring to the balancing required of trial courts in 
determining whether a potential conflict warranted 
disqualification, the Court wrote: 
         [A] district court must pass on the issue 
         whether or not to allow a waiver of a conflict 
         of interest by a criminal defendant not with 
         the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has 
         taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial 
         context when relationships between parties are 
         seen through a glass, darkly.  The likelihood 
         and dimensions of nascent conflicts of 
         interest are notoriously hard to predict, even 
         for those thoroughly familiar with criminal 
         trials. . . . For these reasons we think the 
         district court must be allowed substantial 
         latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of 
         interest . . . in the more common cases where 
         a potential for conflict exists which may or 
         may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the 
         trial progresses. . . . 
 
              . . . . 
 
         . . . The District Court must recognize a 
         presumption in favor of  [a defendant's] 
         counsel of choice, but that presumption may be 
         overcome not only by a demonstration of actual 
         conflict but by a showing of a serious 
         potential for conflict. 
 
Id. at 162-64, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700.  The court also noted that, 
even apart from the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, the 
district court's independent duty "to investigate potential 
conflicts arises in part from the legitimate wish of district 
courts that their judgments remain intact on appeal."  Id. at 161, 
108 S. Ct. at 1698.  Finally, the Court noted with approval that in 
the case before it "the District Court relied on instinct and 
judgment based on experience in making its decision."  Id. at 163, 
108 S. Ct. at 1699. 
         We begin by observing that the unique factual scenario 
presented by Binns' proposed representation of Voigt is quite 
different from the one presented in Wheat.  This is not a case 
where the district court's sole or even primary interest was in 
protecting Voigt's right to the effective assistance of counsel by 
disqualifying an attorney whose potential conflicts of interest 
might impede his ability to defend his client.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lussier, 71 F.3d 456 (2d Cir. 1995) (reviewing propriety 
of trial court's decision to accept defendant's waiver of conflict- 
free representation), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1321 (1996); United 
States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994) (reviewing propriety 
of disqualification ordered to safeguard defendant's right to 
conflict-free representation), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2558 
(1995). 
         On the contrary, as the record makes clear, what 
concerned the district court was the possibility that Binns' prior 
representation of the Trust and its members during the grand jury 
investigation might affect Anderskow's, Anchor's and Travis' 
ability to receive a fair trial.  Nevertheless, because the effect 
of a disqualification is to deny a criminal defendant his or her 
presumptive right to chosen counsel, the question under Wheat is 
the same, even where the trial court's disqualification of chosen 
counsel is aimed at protecting the rights of persons other than the 
defendant.  Thus, we must determine whether the district court's 
conclusion that there was an actual or serious potential for 
conflict of interest constituted an abuse of discretion.  Cf.Moscony, 927 
F.2d at 750-51 (reviewing disqualification of 
defendant's attorney aimed, in part, at protecting rights of 
several government witnesses attorney represented at grand jury); 
United States ex rel. Stewart v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(reviewing disqualification of attorney aimed, in part, at 
protecting rights of witness attorney had represented in the 
past). 
         We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
disqualification of Binns.  It was undisputed that Binns 
represented the Trust and Anderskow for purposes of responding to 
the grand jury subpoenas.  There was also a very real possibility 
that Anderskow might testify at trial, thereby subjecting himself 
to cross-examination by Binns.  We noted in Moscony that 
"[c]onflicts of interest arise whenever an attorney's loyalties are 
divided, and an attorney who cross-examines former clients 
inherently encounters divided loyalties."  927 F.2d at 750 
(citation omitted).  Since there was a strong possibility that 
Anderskow might face cross-examination by a former attorney, there 
was a serious potential for a conflict of interest which, 
notwithstanding Voigt's attempt to downplay it on appeal, warranted 
disqualification.  Wheat, 486 U.S. at 153, 108 S. Ct. at 1692 
(disqualification due to conflict proper despite defendant's 
attempts on appeal to minimize its extent). 
         Voigt makes much of the district court's refusal to 
accept Anchors' and Anderskow's proffered waiver of the attorney- 
client privilege in the event that Binns would have to cross- 
examine them at trial.  Nevertheless, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision.  As the Wheat Court 
noted, at the beginning of a criminal trial, "[t]he likelihood and 
dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to 
predict . . . ."  Id. at 162-63, 108 S. Ct. at 1699.  Here, the 
district court obviously feared that if during trial the nature of 
Binns' relationship with Anderskow and Anchors turned out to be 
more significant than first thought, Anchors' and Anderskow's 
rights to a fair trial could be jeopardized, thereby generating 
potential appellate issues.  We have recognized that the district 
court has "an institutional interest in protecting the truth- 
seeking function of the proceedings over which it is presiding . . 
. [and] an independent interest in protecting a fairly rendered 
verdict from trial tactics that may be designed to generate issues 
on appeal."  Moscony, 927 F.2d at 749.  Accord Stewart, 870 F.2d at 
856-57 ("Wheat emphasized the trial judge's duty to preserve the 
integrity of the justice system by assuring [all] defendants a fair 
trial.").  We find nothing improper in the district court's refusal 
to accept Anchors' and Anderskow's proffered waiver. 
         Moreover, at least one codefendant vehemently refused to 
waive the attorney-client privilege.  Travis was a member of the 
Trust during the grand jury investigation and had substantial 
interaction with Binns during that period.  Apart from the fact 
that this only added to the district court's growing concern about 
the ability of Voigt's codefendants to receive a fair trial, Binns' 
prior interaction with Travis may have been sufficient, in and of 
itself, to warrant disqualification since Binns may have acquired 
confidential information about her. 
         In Stamler, for example, we held that a trial court had 
properly disqualified counsel for a corporation from serving as the 
criminal defense attorney to the corporation's former president 
despite the counsel's insistence that he had received no 
information about the president's criminal activities while acting 
as counsel to the corporation.  "[I]t was not unreasonable for the 
[trial court] to find that [the lawyer] might have obtained 
information related to the criminal proceeding."  650 F.2d at 480.  
In United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 95 (1994), the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit upheld the disqualification of a corporate attorney who 
sought to represent a corporate officer after having previously 
attended a deposition with one of the corporation's employees.  The 
deposition concerned the same matter giving rise to the 
prosecution, and the employee was to testify against the officer 
during the criminal trial.  The Second Circuit rejected the 
defendant's claim that the disqualification was improper because 
the attorney-client relationship allegedly giving rise to the 
conflict was between the corporation and the attorney: "in this 
case, [the witness], as an employee at [the corporation] when he 
was deposed, should be considered a privy of the company.  As such 
his joinder in the motion to disqualify [the attorney] was 
sufficient to assert the adverse nature of his interest and the 
confidences he may have disclosed . . . ."  Id. at 1031. 
         Here, Travis was adamant that she had imparted 
confidential information to Binns, and she indicated that she would 
take the stand in her own defense at trial, thereby subjecting 
herself to potential cross-examination by Binns.  The district 
court once again had an independent duty to safeguard Travis' right 
to a fair trial and to protect a potential judgment against her 
from attack on appeal.  See Moscony, 927 F.2d at 751; Stamler, 650 
F.2d at 480; see also Rogers, 9 F.3d at 1025. 
         In sum, we conclude that the district court acted 
prudently given the unenviable situation with which it was 
presented.  James Binns had substantial involvement in the grand 
jury investigation and he had sent a letter to the government 
tacitly acknowledging his multiple representation of Voigt, 
Anderskow and the Trust.  In light of the district court's obvious 
interest in safeguarding the codefendants' rights to a fair trial 
by avoiding the possibility that they would be cross-examined by 
Binns, we hold that the presumption in favor of Voigt's 
constitutional right to counsel of choice had been adequately 
rebutted.  Accordingly, we reject Voigt's claim that the disquali- 
fication of Binns violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 
choice. 
                                V. 
                 THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONVICTIONS 
         Voigt alleges that his convictions on two counts of money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1)(A)(i) are 
legally insufficient because the government failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the financial transactions forming the 
basis of the laundering convictions "in fact involve[d] the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity."  Id.  We review 
sufficiency of the evidence claims under a deferential standard.  
"It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses.  The verdict of a jury must be 
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most 
favorable to the Government, to support it."  United States v. 
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir.) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995, 110 S. Ct. 
546 (1989).  If "any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979), then 
the verdict of the jury must be sustained. 
                                A. 
         In this case, Voigt was convicted of depositing the 
proceeds of a certain transaction known as the "Neville Price 
transaction" into an account in the First Fidelity Bank in 
violation of 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  The evidence adduced at 
trial demonstrated that on October 1, 1991, a $500,000 advance fee 
from the "Neville Price" transaction was deposited into codefendant 
Ralph Anderskow's escrow account, which at the time contained over 
$600,000 from other sources.  On October 4, 1991, two wire 
transfers were made from Anderskow's account to Voigt's First 
Fidelity account, one for $90,000 and the other for $32,000.  These 
deposits formed the basis of the two money-laundering convictions 
that Voigt now challenges.  Voigt contends that because only 
$500,000 out of the $1.1 million in Anderskow's account was 
"tainted," the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the two wire transfers, which totaled $122,000, "involve[d] 
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity."  Id. 
                                B. 
         Voigt concedes that not all of the money involved in a 
financial transaction that is the subject of a money laundering 
charge must derive from the proceeds of money laundering activity.  
Rather, he contends that because Congress required that the 
financial transaction "in fact involve[]" the "proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity," id. (emphasis added), the government 
must prove that at least one dollar (or, even, one penny) is 
traceable to the proceeds of unlawful activity--a mathematical 
impossibility in cases such as this where (1) the wire transfers 
came from an account in which tainted funds had been commingled 
with untainted funds, and (2) the amount of the transfer was less 
than the amount of untainted funds in the account.  Both the 
government and Voigt characterize the issue as one involving "which 
side should bear the uncertainty when tracing becomes an 
impossibility."  Government's Br. at 46.   
         While the trend in our sister circuits has been to reject 
the sort of legal sufficiency challenge raised by Voigt as a matter 
of statutory construction, see United States v. Cancelliere, 69 
F.3d 1116, 1120 (11th Cir. 1995), we need not decide this issue, 
because we conclude that Voigt's claim fails on the facts.  While 
the flow-chart that the government relied on to establish the 
source of the $122,000 deposit does not reveal the source of the 
other funds in Anderskow's account, Anderskow himself conceded on 
cross-examination that all but $26,000 of the funds deposited into 
his Continental Bank account between 1990 and 1993 were advance 
fees paid by borrowers of and investors in the Trust.  As there was 
uncontroverted evidence at trial that no borrower or investor ever 
received any funds from the Trust, and as the jury found that the 
Trust was the engine of a scheme to defraud, we conclude that a 
rational trier of fact could easily have concluded that virtually 
all of the funds in Anderskow's account at the time of the $122,000 
transfer represented the fruits of specified illegal activity. 
                               VI. 
                       THE FORFEITURE ORDER 
         In connection with the four money laundering counts 
charged in the superseding indictment, the government brought 
separate criminal forfeiture allegations under 18 U.S.C.  982 
seeking forfeiture of certain vehicles and pieces of jewelry either 
as "involved in" or "traceable to" Voigt's money laundering 
activity, id.  982(a)(1), or as substitute assets under 21 U.S.C. 
 853(p)(5), the CCE criminal forfeiture provision, which is 
incorporated in 18 U.S.C.  982(b)(1).  At a nonjury proceeding 
conducted prior to sentencing, the district court determined that 
Voigt's money laundering convictions rendered him liable to the 
government for $1,661,960 in criminal forfeiture.  In satisfaction 
of that amount, the court ordered forfeiture of, inter alia, two 
pieces of jewelry, finding "by a preponderance of the evidence" 
that they were "items personal property . . . traceable to the 
money involved in the [money-laundering] violations.  App. at 1246.  
The jewelry had been purchased with funds from an account in which 
money laundering proceeds had been commingled with other funds -- 
numerous deposits and withdrawals having intervened between the 
deposit of the laundered funds and the purchase of the jewelry. 
         Voigt raises two assignments of error.  First, he 
contends that the district court applied the wrong burden of 
persuasion.  He maintains that our decision in United States v. 
Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994), requires the government to 
prove its forfeiture allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Second, Voigt asserts that the government failed to prove that the 
jewelry it sought was "traceable to" the proceeds of his money 
laundering activity, since it had been purchased with commingled 
funds from an account subject to numerous intervening deposits and 
withdrawals after the original deposit of the laundered funds.   
         Both of these contentions raise issues of first 
impression in this circuit.  With respect to the burden-of-proof 
issue, we conclude, as did the district court, that the 
preponderance standard applies.  We agree with Voigt, however, that 
the numerous intervening deposits and withdrawals into his account 
subsequent to the deposit of the tainted funds make it impossible 
to say that the two items of jewelry are "traceable to" property 
"involved in" the money laundering offense.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the forfeiture order that was incorporated into the judgment 
and remand for further proceedings. 
                                A. 
         The forfeiture provision upon which the court's order was 
based, 18 U.S.C.  982, provides that a district court sentencing 
a person convicted of, inter alia, money laundering in violation of 
18 U.S.C.  1956, "shall order that the person forfeit to the 
United States any property, real or personal, involved in such 
offense, or any property traceable to such property."  18 U.S.C.  
982(a)(1).  Voigt first contends that the government's burden of 
persuasion for criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.  982(a)(1) is 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  We have not yet had occasion to 
address the burden-of-proof issue with respect to  982(a)(1), and 
to date only one other court of appeals has considered it, 
concluding that preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies.  
United States v. Myers, 21 F.2d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1995).  We have, however, addressed this 
issue twice previously in the context of other criminal forfeiture 
provisions.  Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 881 (RICO; reasonable doubt); 
United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987) (CCE; 
preponderance).  A description of the Sandini, Pelullo and Myersdecisions 
is in order. 
                                1. 
         In Sandini, 816 F.2d at 869, we addressed the appropriate 
burden of persuasion under 21 U.S.C.  853, the CCE criminal 
forfeiture provision.  The defendant there argued that  853(d)'s 
inclusion of a rebuttable presumption of forfeitability if the 
government could demonstrate two factors by a preponderance of the 
evidence was unconstitutional to the extent it failed to require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   After discussing the history of 
and distinction between civil in rem and criminal in personamforfeiture, 
we concluded that criminal forfeiture under CCE 
constitutes punishment for a crime, and not a separate element of 
the offense, notwithstanding Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) (requiring the 
indictment to specify the extent or interest of the property 
subject to forfeiture) and Fed R. Crim. P. 31(e) (requiring the jury 
to return a special verdict on same).  Sandini, 816 F.2d at 875 & 
n.7 ("assumption" in Rule 31(e) that forfeiture is element of the 
offense to be tried and proved is akin to nonbinding legislative 
history).  Because other federal statutes providing for enhanced 
penalties have established the government's burden of proof as a 
preponderance of the evidence, we concluded that  853(d) 
withstands constitutional scrutiny as long as the forfeiture 
proceeding follows a conviction by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
         Seven years later we confronted the same question in the 
context of 18 U.S.C.  1963, the RICO statute's criminal forfeiture 
provision.  Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 881.  We held that the beyond-a- 
reasonable-doubt standard governs such forfeitures.  Our conclusion 
was premised mainly on Congress' simultaneous amendments to the 
RICO and CCE forfeiture statutes in 1984, and its decision not to 
add a rebuttable presumption provision to  1963(a) when it added 
such a provision to the CCE statute.  See 21 U.S.C.  853(d) 
(discussed in Sandini, 816 F.2d at 874-75).  We concluded that the 
omission was deliberate and, hence, dispositive: "This indicates 
that Congress intended the higher beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard to control in a  1963(a) proceeding.  If Congress wanted 
a preponderance standard for  1963(a), it would have so stated as 
it specifically did for CCE."  Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 905.  See id. at 
903 ("Most important, the CCE rebuttable presumption . . . does notexist 
in the RICO forfeiture provisions.") (citations omitted).  We 
distinguished our decision in Sandini on the basis that it 
pertained only to CCE and could not bind a future panel of this 
court considering a different forfeiture provision.  See id.("Sandini does 
not decide the issue in this case because the 
statute at issue there was CCE, not RICO."). 
         In Myers, 21 F.3d at 826, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the government's burden of proof 
under  982(a)(1) was the preponderance standard.  Noting that it 
had decided in a different case handed down the same day that the 
preponderance standard governed forfeitures under CCE, the court 
reasoned that 
         [t]he language of the money laundering 
         forfeiture statute is very similar to the 
         language of section 853(a).  By stating that 
         "the court, in imposing sentence on a person 
         convicted" of a money laundering offense, 
         shall forfeit property involved in the 
         offense, Congress indicates that forfeiture 
         under the money laundering provision is also a 
         sentencing sanction, not an offense or element 
         of an offense. 
 
Id. at 829 (alteration omitted). 
                                2. 
         While Sandini and Pelullo are useful guides, we begin by 
observing that prior decisions of this court interpreting different 
criminal forfeiture provisions do not constitute binding precedent 
on the issue before us.  Similarly, the reasoning underlying those 
decisions is not binding, although to the extent that the statutes 
are analogous it may be persuasive.  We must begin the task afresh 
and determine which burden of proof Congress intended to apply to 
 982(a)(1). 
         Perhaps the most striking feature of the forfeiture 
provision is that it requires the district court to order 
forfeiture "in imposing sentence on a person [already] convicted of 
an offense in violation of . . . section 1957 . . . of this title 
. . . . "  18 U.S.C.  982(a)(1) (emphasis added).  As the Myerscourt 
observed, the plain language of the statute reveals that 
forfeiture is a form of sentence enhancement that follows a 
previous finding of personal guilt.  Myers, 21 F.3d at 829.  As a 
result, we conclude that the preponderance, not the reasonable 
doubt, standard governs forfeiture under  982(a)(1). 
         Voigt's most forceful argument to the contrary is that 
when Congress enacted the money laundering forfeiture statute, it 
specifically incorporated in  982(b)(1), the statute's procedural 
component, virtually all of the subsections of 21 U.S.C.  853, the 
procedural provisions of the CCE forfeiture statute, yet it omitted 
 853(d), the rebuttable presumption provision we found dispositive 
in Sandini.  Relying on Pelullo, where we attached much 
significance to Congress' failure to add a provision like  853(d) 
to RICO's forfeiture provision, Voigt argues that Congress' 
decision not to include  853(d) as one of the subsections 
incorporated via  982(b)(1) evinces an intent to require 
application of the reasonable doubt standard.  We think Voigt's 
argument proves too much.  At most, Congress may have decided it 
did not want the rebuttable presumption to apply in money 
laundering cases.  But that by no means compels us to conclude that 
the reasonable doubt standard should apply in such cases. 
         Furthermore, acknowledging that the burden of proof is 
simply a means of expressing our tolerance for erroneous outcomes, 
there are good reasons for employing the reasonable doubt standard 
in the RICO context but not in the money laundering context.  The 
RICO forfeiture provision is by far the most far reaching, 
requiring the district court to order forfeiture of "any interest 
the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 
1962," 18 U.S.C.  1963(a)(1), as well as any "interest in," 
"security of," "claim against," or "property or contractual right 
of any kind affording a source of influence over[] any enterprise  
which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, 
or participated in the conduct of in violation of section 1962."  
Id.  1963(a)(2).  The statute further requires forfeiture of "any 
property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the 
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity 
. . . in violation of section 1962."  Id.  1963(a)(3).  Section 
1963(a)'s coverage, to say the least, is extremely broad and 
sweeping.  See Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26, 104  S. 
Ct. 296, 302 (1983) ("The legislative history clearly demonstrates 
that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of 
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its 
economic roots."); Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth 
Amendment: When is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 27 
(1991) ("The most striking aspect of RICO's forfeiture provisions 
is their unprecedented nature and breadth.  The language of the 
forfeiture provisions is extremely broad and comprehensive . . . 
.").  Indeed,  1963(a) sweeps far more broadly than the elements 
of the substantive RICO offense itself.  See 18 U.S.C.  1962.  
Accordingly, since the identity and extent of property subject to 
forfeiture will not have been addressed in the course of proving 
the substantive RICO charge, a reasonable doubt burden of 
persuasion ensures greater accuracy in determining the scope of 
property subject to forfeiture. 
         In the money laundering context, by contrast, the 
forfeiture provision makes clear that the government is entitled 
only to property "involved in" or "traceable to" money laundering 
activity.  See generally United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 
474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992) (government entitled only to "funds" used 
in offense, not whole account into which such funds had been 
deposited).  Furthermore, "property involved in a financial 
transaction" is part of an element of the money laundering offense, 
see 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1), and the term "transaction" is defined 
in the statute.  See id.  1956(c)(3).  Unlike the RICO context, we 
have no reason to doubt that the amount of the transaction that 
forms the basis of a substantive money laundering offense will be 
identified in the indictment and, thus, that its connection to 
money laundering activity will have been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt at trial.  As the government has observed, in many cases the 
only factual issues left for resolution after trial will be whether 
particular items bought with tainted funds are "traceable to" money 
laundering activity.  Applying a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
to that issue appears unnecessary.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
Eighth Circuit's decision in Myers that the government's burden for 
forfeiture under  982(a)(1) is the preponderance standard. 
                                B. 
         Voigt next argues that the government failed to prove 
that the money used to purchase the jewelry in question was 
"traceable to" money laundering proceeds, as required by 18 U.S.C. 
 982(a)(1).  His argument is based on the fact that the jewelry 
was purchased with funds drawn from an account in which money 
laundering proceeds had been commingled with other funds, and that 
those funds were further "diluted" by numerous intervening deposits 
and withdrawals.  Voigt asserts that if the jewelry was subject to 
forfeiture, it was under 21 U.S.C.  853(p)(5), the CCE substitute 
asset provision incorporated into the money laundering forfeiture 
scheme via 18 U.S.C.  982(b)(1).  The government counters by 
observing that criminal forfeiture is an in personam punishment, 
which obviates the need for strict tracing, especially where 
tainted and untainted funds are commingled in a bank account, 
making tracing a virtual impossibility. 
                                1. 
         The government's observation concerning the in personamnature of 
criminal forfeiture is helpful to a certain extent: the 
amount of forfeiture to which the government is entitled under 18 
U.S.C.  982 is not dictated by whether the government can prove 
that certain of the defendant's property is in fact property 
"traceable to" money laundering activity.  When a defendant has 
been convicted of committing $1.6 million in money laundering 
offenses (as Voigt was here), the government has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it is entitled to $1.6 million in criminal 
forfeiture; that amount represents property "involved in" money 
laundering activity for purposes of  982(a)(1).  What is at issue 
here is the question of how the government may go about seizing 
property in satisfaction of that $1.6 million amount. 
         The government's principal contention is that money is 
fungible, making it impossible to differentiate between "tainted" 
and "untainted" dollars in a bank account.  The government also 
advances what is clearly a policy argument, contending that 
interpreting the term "traceable to" to require even some tracing 
"would perversely permit money launderers to escape with all of 
their proceeds intact simply by commingling such tainted proceeds 
with untainted sums--a result Congress could not have intended."  
Government's Br. at 53. 
         To support its arguments, the Government has cited a 
number of cases dealing with the tracing issue in the context of 18 
U.S.C.  1963(a), the RICO statute's criminal forfeiture provision.  
See generally United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 949 (2d 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S. Ct. 711 (1988); 
United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011, 106 S. Ct. 1186 (1986); United 
States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 474 
U.S. 821, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985).  These cases hold that where crime 
proceeds have been commingled in a bank account with untainted 
funds, tracing is not required.  The reasoning supporting those 
holdings is (1) the in personam nature of criminal forfeiture, and 
(2) the courts' conclusion that when Congress used the term 
"traceable to," it could not have intended to require the 
government to demonstrate some nexus between the criminal activity 
and the property sought--at least not where cash has been deposited 
into a bank account. 
         Regardless of whether these cases were correct on their 
merits, however, they were decided before the President signed into 
law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 
Stat. 4374-75 (1988).  With that act Congress added subsection (b) 
to  982, which incorporates the CCE forfeiture statute's 
"substitute asset" provision: 
         [i]f any of the property described in 
         subsection (a) of this section, as a result of 
         any act or omission of the defendant . . . has 
         been commingled with other property which 
         cannot be divided without difficulty; the 
         court shall order the forfeiture of any other 
         property of the defendant up to the value of 
         any property described in paragraph[] . . . 
         (5). 
 
21 U.S.C.  853(p)(5).  The inclusion of the substitute asset 
provision in the money laundering forfeiture scheme represents 
Congress' express recognition that property subject to criminal 
forfeiture can be commingled with "untainted" property.  It may 
also be an acknowledgement by Congress that its earlier-enacted 
criminal forfeiture provisions, such as RICO and CCE, were 
unartfully drafted to the extent that they failed to address the 
problem posed by commingled property. 
         In our view the specific inclusion in  982 of a 
substitute asset provision precludes us from interpreting the term 
"traceable to," as did the courts in the RICO context, to avoid a 
perceived bad policy result.  See United States v. Ripinsky, 20 
F.3d 359, 365 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (" 982 . . . defines forfeitable 
assets to be only those associated with the underlying offense or 
traceable to the offense and distinguishes between 'forfeitable' 
and 'substitute' assets.").  Because Congress has made the 
determination not to "perversely permit money launderers to escape 
with all of their proceeds intact simply by commingling such 
tainted proceeds with untainted sums . . . .,"  Government's Br. at 
53, we should not be in the business of overlooking the plain terms 
of a statute in order to implement what we, as federal judges, 
believe might be better policy.  Accordingly, the government's 
policy arguments, along with the cases supporting them, are 
inapposite. 
         Seeking to avoid our conclusion that cases decided prior 
to the enactment of the money laundering forfeiture statute are not 
controlling, the government observes that in 1986 Congress added a 
substitute asset provision to RICO's forfeiture scheme.  Relying on 
In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 920 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 
U.S. 952, 111 S. Ct. 2258 (1991), the government contends that the 
addition of a substitute asset provision to the RICO statute could 
not affirmatively undo the settled judicial determination that the 
words "traceable to" in the RICO forfeiture statute do not require 
tracing of commingled funds.  The government therefore suggests 
that in the money laundering forfeiture context it can seek 
forfeiture of items purchased with commingled funds either as 
"traceable to" or as substitute assets.  We disagree. 
         As the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ripinsky makes clear, 
the government's position is internally inconsistent.  The 
substitute asset provision comes into play only when forfeitable 
property cannot be identified as directly "involved in" or 
"traceable to" money laundering activity.  Clearly, if funds 
commingled in a bank account are sufficiently identifiable as to be 
considered "traceable to" money laundering activity, then the 
substitute asset provision should have no applicability whatsoever.  
Accordingly, the government's contention that the "traceable to" 
and substitute asset theories merely create alternative paths to 
forfeiture, which the government may choose at its option, is 
illogical. 
         We also do not understand why an amendment to a statute 
cannot affirmatively reverse, or at least cast substantial doubt 
on, prior court decisions interpreting earlier versions of that 
statute.  This is especially true where, in undertaking to discern 
the plain meaning, those decisions essentially held (for policy 
reasons) that Congress simply could not have meant what it said.  
Indeed, if the legitimacy of the courts' interpretation of the RICO 
statute had been beyond doubt, then the addition of a substitute 
asset provision to the RICO, CCE and money laundering criminal 
forfeiture schemes would seem superfluous. 
         Furthermore, we think the government's interpretation of 
Billman proves too much.  In Billman the Fourth Circuit cited to 
the prior case law holding that the in personam nature of criminal 
forfeiture makes tracing under the RICO statute's forfeiture 
provision unnecessary.  It then made the unremarkable observation, 
which the government apparently finds significant, that "[t]hese 
principles are embodied in an amendment to the act, which makes 
provision for the forfeiture of substitute assets."  915 F.2d at 
920.  Contrary to the government's interpretation, however, that 
observation may signal the Fourth Circuit's view (which we 
expressed above) that Congress recognized its unartfulness in using 
the term "traceable to" in its forfeiture statutes.  Moreover, the 
Fourth Circuit may have recognized that in amending forfeiture 
statutes to include a substitute asset provision, Congress may have 
appreciated that courts had been stretching to avoid the result of 
applying the plain meaning of the term "traceable to" to commingled 
property. 
         Even if Billman can be read to suggest that the addition 
of a substitute asset provision to RICO's criminal forfeiture 
scheme cannot undo prior judicial interpretations of the words 
"traceable to" in the RICO context, we simply cannot ignore the 
plain fact that the money laundering criminal forfeiture provision 
contains a substitute asset provision that appears to be addressed 
directly to the situation confronting us in this case.  We are 
unaware of any decision that has imported the restrictive 
definition of "traceable to" prevalent in the RICO context into the 
money laundering forfeiture scheme. 
         In sum, to accept the government's argument that 
"traceable to" does not mean what it says for purposes of 
commingled property, in effect would render the substitute asset 
provision a nullity, in contravention of a well-settled canon of 
statutory construction that "courts should disfavor interpretations 
of statutes that render language superfluous." Connecticut Nat'l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). 
                                2. 
         We hold that the term "traceable to" means exactly what 
it says.  In light of our holding on the burden of proof, this 
means that the government must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the property it seeks under  982(a)(1) in 
satisfaction of the amount of criminal forfeiture to which it is 
entitled has some nexus to the property "involved in" the money 
laundering offense.  For example, if the defendant receives 
$500,000 cash in a money laundering transaction and hides the cash 
in his house, the government may seize that money as property 
"involved in" the money laundering offense.  If the defendant 
purchased a $250,000 item with that money, the government may seek 
the remaining cash as "involved in" the offense, whereas the item 
purchased is subject to forfeiture as property "traceable to" 
property involved in the money laundering offense.   
         Where the property involved in a money laundering 
transaction is commingled in an account with untainted property, 
however, the government's burden of showing that money in the 
account or an item purchased with cash withdrawn therefrom is 
"traceable to" money laundering activity will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to satisfy.  While we can envision a situation where 
$500,000 is added to an account containing only $500, such that one 
might argue that the probability of seizing "tainted" funds is far 
greater than the government's preponderance burden (50.1%), such an 
approach is ultimately unworkable.  As the Seventh Circuit, 
speaking through Judge Easterbrook, has observed, a bank account is 
simply a number on a piece of paper: 
         Bank accounts do not commit crimes; people do.  
         It makes no sense to confiscate whatever 
         balance happens to be in an account bearing a 
         particular number, just because proceeds of 
         crime once passed through that account. . . . 
         An "account" is a name, a routing device like 
         the address of a building; the money is the 
         "property" [for purposes of the forfeiture 
         statute].  Once we distinguish the money from 
         its container, it also follows that the 
         presence of one illegal dollar in an account 
         does not taint the rest--as if the dollar 
         obtained from [money laundering activity] were 
         like a drop of ink falling into a glass of 
         water. 
 
$448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992). 
         The solution, we think, is to give effect to the 
substitute asset provision.  See 18 U.S.C.  982(b)(1) 
(incorporating 21 U.S.C.  853(p)(5)).  Thus, once a defendant has 
commingled laundered funds with untainted funds--whether in a bank 
account or in a tattered suitcase--such that they "cannot be 
divided without difficulty," 21 U.S.C.  853(p)(5), the government 
must satisfy its forfeiture judgment through the substitute asset 
provision.  Once property subject to forfeiture under  982(a)(1) 
is no longer identifiable due to some act of the defendant, the 
government may seek any property, cash or merchandise, in 
satisfaction of the amount of criminal forfeiture to which it is 
entitled. 
                                3. 
         In light of our analysis, the district court's forfeiture 
order, which is incorporated into Voigt's judgment of conviction 
and sentence, cannot stand.  Even under the preponderance standard, 
the items of jewelry cannot be considered "traceable to" the 
proceeds of money laundering activity; the jewelry was purchased 
with funds from an account into which money laundering proceeds had 
been commingled with other funds, and after numerous intervening 
deposits and withdrawals.  We therefore cannot say that, more 
probably than not, the jewelry is "traceable to" money laundering 
activity. 
         Notwithstanding our conclusion, the government continues 
to be entitled to $1.6 million in criminal forfeiture.  But to the 
extent that the forfeiture order incorporated in the judgment 
required Voigt to hand jewelry over to the government under an 
erroneous legal determination, the government is improperly in 
possession of that jewelry.  We do not envision that the district 
court will have to conduct a de novo forfeiture proceeding on 
remand.  Since all that is at issue is the process by which the 
government may seize property in satisfaction of the $1.6 million 
to which it is lawfully entitled, on remand the government should 
be permitted to move to amend the judgment to reflect that the 
jewelry is forfeitable as a substitute asset.  Cf. United States v. 
Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1995) (no error where, after notice 
of appeal from conviction was filed, government moved for and 
received from district court permission to seize certain property 
as "substitute assets"); Todd Barnet & Ivan Fox, Trampling on the 
Sixth Amendment: The Continued Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 
22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1995) ("The substitute assets 
provisions constitute a procedural alternative for collecting a 
forfeiture judgment and are not a form of punishment in their own 
right . . . ."). 
                               VII. 
                   THE TAX EVASION CONVICTIONS 
         Voigt contends that his convictions on two counts of tax 
evasion under 26 U.S.C.  7201 (relating to the 1990 and 1991 tax 
years) are legally insufficient because the government failed to 
adduce evidence of an "affirmative act" of tax evasion, which is an 
essential element of the offense.  
                                A. 
         Prior to trial, Voigt moved for and received a bill of 
particulars relating to the tax evasion counts because the 
indictment failed to specify the affirmative acts on which the 
government intended to rely at trial.  The bill of particulars 
indicated four separate acts of evasion: (1) Voigt's submission of 
a partially false and partially incomplete Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS") Form 433-A understating the amount in his First Fidelity 
Bank account, his failure to fulfill his promise to provide the 
missing information to an IRS agent, and his failure to tell the 
agent of his advance-fee income earned in 1989 and 1990; (2) 
Voigt's decision not to purchase a piece of jewelry with cash when 
informed that a Currency Transaction Report would have to be filed 
with the IRS; (3) Voigt's role in requiring potential victims of 
the Trust to fill out bizarre confidentiality agreements that 
forbade them from disclosing details of their transaction; and (4) 
Voigt's maintenance of overseas bank accounts and his direction to 
Anderskow to wire funds into those accounts.  At trial the 
government introduced evidence on all four affirmative acts. 
                                B. 
         Essential to a conviction under 26 U.S.C.  7201 is "1) 
the existence of a tax deficiency, 2) an affirmative act 
constituting an attempt to evade or defeat payment of the tax, and 
3) willfulness."  United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023, 113 S. Ct. 664 (1992).  Voigt 
claims that the government's proof at trial failed to establish the 
second element as a matter of law because none of the alleged 
affirmative acts shows that his purpose was to evade the payment of 
taxes.  Bearing in mind that "[o]ur review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence is 'governed by strict principles of deference to a 
jury's findings,'" id. (quoting United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 
101, 106 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S. Ct. 189 
(1984)), we reject Voigt's legal sufficiency challenge. 
                                1. 
         With respect to the first affirmative act charged by the 
government, the submission in September of 1990 of a materially 
misleading Form 433-A, Voigt claims that "[t]hese false statements 
could not . . . have been used to evade taxes for 1990 and 1991, 
taxes which were not even due until April 15, 1991 and April 15, 
1992, respectively."  Voigt's Br. at 36.  The IRS uses Form 433-A 
to identify potential assets with which a taxpayer who owes back 
taxes can pay them and to establish a method of collection.  Since 
the form at issue dealt with payment of taxes owed in (or prior to) 
1990, and since it was submitted before the deficiencies that are 
the focus of the tax evasion charges arose, Voigt contends that it 
cannot have been calculated "to mislead the government or conceal 
funds to avoid payment of an admitted and accurate deficiency" as 
a matter of law.  McGill, 964 F.2d at 230 (emphasis added). 
         In McGill we addressed the question whether an 
affirmative act can predate the existence of a tax deficiency and 
cited to conflicting authority on that issue.  We declined to 
answer that question definitively, however, because the crime 
charged in the indictment pointed to the date the deficiency arose 
as the date of the offense: "The indictment by its terms required 
the jury to look forward in time for evidence of affirmative acts."  
Id. at 231.  Once again, we decline the parties' invitation to rule 
as a general matter on whether predeficiency conduct can satisfy 
the statute's "affirmative act" element.  For here, as in McGill, 
the superseding indictment charged Voigt with violating 26 U.S.C. 
 7201 "[o]n or about April 15, 1991" and "[o]n or about April 15, 
1992."  App. at 432, 433.  Accordingly, even if conduct predating 
the existence of a deficiency can constitute proof of an 
affirmative act of tax evasion, the government's failure to include 
the predeficiency period in the indictment's specification of the 
offense charged precludes it from relying on conduct predating the 
existence of the deficiency as substantive evidence of affirmative 
acts of evasion.  McGill, 964 F.2d at 231 ("The Government must 
prove attempted evasion for each count beginning at the dates 
[charged in the indictment]."). 
         This same reasoning applies to the government's 
contentions that Voigt's failure to fulfill his promise to provide 
the IRS agent with income information missing from his Form 433-A 
and his failure to disclose to the IRS agent advance-fee income 
earned in 1989 and 1990 constitute affirmative evasive acts.  These 
actions, like the submission of the false Form 433-A in the first 
place, were taken in the context of a collection action for 
delinquent taxes from prior years, and preceded the tax liabilities 
on which the evasion charges are based.  As with the submission of 
the false Form 433-A, we believe that the circumstances do not 
warrant a finding that these prior acts were affirmative evasive 
acts that laid the groundwork for later tax evasion. 
                                2. 
         Nevertheless, the three additional affirmative acts 
proved by the government at trial, when taken together, are 
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.  The Supreme Court has 
said of the affirmative act element that "[i]f the tax evasion 
motive plays any part in such conduct[,] the offense may be made 
out even though the conduct may also serve other purposes such as 
concealment of other crime."  Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 
499, 63 S. Ct. 364, 368 (1943).  Elaborating on the "affirmative 
act" requirement, we stated in McGill that an "affirmative act is 
anything done to mislead the government or conceal funds to avoid 
payment of an admitted and accurate deficiency."  McGill, 964 F.2d 
at 230.  We also noted that "[o]ne act will suffice."  Id. at 229 
(citing United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556-57 (7th Cir. 
1987)).  Whereas simple nonpayment of taxes owed cannot sustain a 
conviction under the statute, acts intended to conceal or mislead 
are sufficient. 
         Voigt argues that the government's proofs as to the 
second, third and fourth affirmative acts were legally insufficient 
because they were equally consistent with innocent activity and, 
more specifically, because there was no evidence linking them to a 
"motive" or "intent" to evade.  According to Voigt, therefore, 
there must be direct evidence of intent before a rational trier of 
fact can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that an affirmative act 
was undertaken, in part, to evade the payment of income tax.  
Voigt's legal proposition is without precedential support. 
         In the majority of criminal cases, the element of intent 
is inferred from circumstantial evidence.  See generally United 
States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992) ("It is not 
unusual that the government will not have direct evidence.  [Mens 
rea] is often proven by circumstances.").  The rule is no different 
in tax evasion prosecutions.  The Supreme Court in Spies stated 
that "any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead 
or conceal," is sufficient to satisfy the "affirmative act" 
element.  Spies, 317 U.S. at 499, 63 S. Ct. at 368 (emphasis 
added).  Accord United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 
1991) (evasion of payment "involves conduct designed to place 
assets beyond the government's reach after a tax liability has been 
assessed") (emphasis added); Conley, 826 F.2d at 556 (rational jury 
can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which 
defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. 
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57-58 (D.C. Cir.) (jury could infer intent to 
evade where defendant carried on "cash lifestyle"), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 817, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987); United States v. Voorhies, 658 
F.2d 710, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Voorhies' conduct in 1974 [of 
liquidating assets and transporting proceeds to Switzerland] had 
the 'likely effect' of misleading or concealing.").  These cases 
simply require that there be some evidence from which a jury could 
infer an intent to mislead or conceal beyond mere failure to pay 
assessed taxes; it is for the jury to determine, as a matter of 
fact, whether the affirmative act was undertaken, in part, to 
conceal funds from or mislead the government. 
         We have no difficulty concluding, therefore, that Voigt's 
refusal to pay for a piece of jewelry in cash; his use of bizarre 
confidentiality agreements; and his maintenance of overseas bank 
accounts, taken together, provided the jury with sufficient 
evidence from which it could infer that they were "designed" to 
evade the payment of admitted tax deficiencies, even if such 
actions otherwise might constitute wholly innocent conduct.  SeeUnited 
States v. Jungles, 903 F.2d 468, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(activity that is lawful itself can constitute affirmative act to 
evade); see also United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 86 (3d Cir. 
1992) (transporting funds to foreign countries, thereby making it 
more difficult to trace, provides inference of intent to evade), 
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906, 113 S. Ct. 2332 (1993). 
         The evidence at trial indicating a possible motive 
unrelated to tax obligations for some or all of the affirmative 
acts, upon which Voigt heavily relies on appeal, was before the 
jury.  It chose to reject Voigt's proffered interpretation and 
accept the government's.  Given our deferential standard of review, 
United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992), along 
with the settled rule that we draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the jury's verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
319, 99 S. Ct 2781, 2789 (1979), we may not substitute our (or 
Voigt's) judgment for that of the jury; Voigt's legal sufficiency 
challenge is essentially a futile attempt to rehash his closing 
argument. 
         Finally, even were we to agree that, standing alone, the 
three remaining affirmative acts were insufficient to establish 
Voigt's intent to evade payment, our decision in McGill instructs 
that the jury was entitled to consider Voigt's submission of a 
materially misleading Form 433-A in 1990 as relevant evidence on 
the question whether his later actions were intended to be evasive.  
See supra n.25.  This provided the jury with ample basis on which 
to convict, since in 1990 Voigt had materially misled the IRS in 
order to hamper its attempts to collect back taxes.  The jury 
readily could have concluded that Voigt's later actions were not 
innocent as Voigt claimed but, rather, were part of a conscious and 
continued attempt to thwart the IRS's collection efforts.  
Accordingly, we reject Voigt's legal sufficiency challenge to his 
tax evasion convictions. 
                              VIII. 
                      THE RESTITUTION ORDER 
         At sentencing, the district court ordered Voigt to make 
$7,040,000 in restitution.  Finding that Voigt had secreted 
substantial sums of money derived from the Trust's advance-fee 
scheme, the district court noted in its amended judgment that 
         as was demonstrated at trial and at various 
         motion hearings, [] defendant has himself 
         deposited or forwarded to others for deposit 
         in various accounts in various European banks, 
         millions of dollars in cash and other 
         property.  To cite but two examples, the 
         Government has already obtained a release and 
         assignment of funds and property currently 
         frozen at United Overseas Bank in Switzerland 
         in the account of defendant's former 
         girlfriend; and the Government has received a 
         similar release and assignment from defendant 
         pertaining to funds frozen in his accounts at 
         the same bank. 
 
App. at 1394.  Voigt now challenges the district court's 
restitution order and, more specifically, the lack of "specific 
findings" as to his ability to pay.  Claiming that "there is no 
evidence of any funds elsewhere," Voigt's Br. at 48, Voigt asks us 
to vacate the restitution order and remand for recalculation.  We 
review the restitution award for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 1286 (1996). 
                                A. 
         In United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1992), 
we held that when a district court imposes an order of restitution 
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), codified at18 U.S.C. 
 3663-64, it is required "'to make specific findings as 
to the factual issues that are relevant to the application of the 
restitution provisions . . . .'"  Id. at 961 (quoting United States 
v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985)).  One of the relevant 
provisions to which the requirement of specific factual findings 
applies is "the defendant's ability to pay and the financial need 
of defendant and the defendant's dependents."  United States v. 
Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.) ("Copple I") (citing Logar, 975 
F.2d at 961), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 488 (1994)).  The 
restitution amount must reflect the defendant's ability to pay 
within five years after the date of sentencing.  18 U.S.C.  
3663(e)(2)(C). 
         In Copple I, the district court ordered restitution of 
approximately four million dollars after simply adopting as its 
factual findings the amount of loss to the victims calculated in 
the presentence report, but without specific findings on either the 
amount of loss or Copple's ability to pay.  After the case had been 
remanded to the district court and a resentencing hearing had been 
held, the court reinstated its restitution order of four million 
dollars.  Although it had made specific findings concerning the 
amount of the loss, which Copple did not challenge, the district 
court found that despite the defendant's current financial 
hardship, he had the potential to earn money in the future given 
his past success as a businessman. 
         On appeal a different panel of this court again vacated 
the restitution award and remanded for resentencing.  United States 
v. Copple, 74 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Copple II").  We found that 
a defendant's past success as a businessman, alone, could not 
justify the four-million-dollar restitution award, since it was 
unrealistic that the defendant would be able to earn that amount of 
money over five years.  The court made no "findings about Copple's 
financial needs, and observed only that 'the family is in dire 
financial straights at this time,' an assertion hardly supportive 
of the exceptionally large restitution amount it ultimately 
ordered."  Id. at 483. 
         As to the government's contention that the restitution 
award should be sustained because it implicitly reflected amounts 
attributable to assets Copple acquired with misappropriated funds, 
we agreed that 
         [t]he proceeds from a defendant's illegal 
         conduct that the defendant still retains or 
         can recoup are certainly encompassed within 
         the "financial resources of the defendant" 
         that the district court should consider in 
         fashioning a restitution order.  Of course, 
         the continued existence of such proceeds is a 
         factual issue that should be accompanied by 
         "specific findings." 
 
Id. at 484 (citation omitted).  We went on to note that, in 
determining a restitution award based on "the court's reasonable 
belief that there are secreted assets," id., the district court may 
calculate the total proceeds of defendant's crime minus amounts 
already accounted for, and then place the burden of accounting for 
the remainder on the defendant.  The defendant may point to 
specific disbursements indicating that he is no longer in 
possession of funds obtained as a result of his crimes or assets 
purchased therewith.  "Unless [the defendant] can disprove 
possession of any remaining amount in this manner, the court may 
consider the resulting figure as constituting 'financial resources 
of the defendant.'"  Id. 
                                B. 
         In light of our decision in Copple II, which was filed 
after briefing and argument in this case had been completed, we see 
no basis for setting aside the district court's restitution award 
as an abuse of discretion.  In fact, the district court's analysis 
was prescient in that it essentially employed the framework 
contemplated by Copple II for ordering restitution where there is 
reason to believe that a defendant has secreted proceeds from 
illegal activity.  Relying on Copple II, we divide our analysis 
into two parts.  We first determine whether the district court's 
finding that Voigt had secreted the proceeds of his crime, thereby 
shifting to him the burden to explain their whereabouts, was an 
abuse of discretion.  We then determine whether the district 
court's ultimate restitution order constituted an abuse of 
discretion given that the burden of persuasion as to the location 
of the proceeds, as well as on financial resources and ability to 
pay, had shifted to defendant.  Copple II, 74 F.3d at 484; 18 
U.S.C.  3664(d). 
                                1. 
         That the district court was entitled to proceed with the 
sort of analysis contemplated in Copple II cannot seriously be 
disputed.  The district court's restitution order, along with the 
evidence at trial, provided ample basis for the court's conclusion 
that Voigt had attempted to secrete the proceeds of his criminal 
activity in foreign bank accounts and in his former girlfriend's 
name.  Since there is evidence in the record to support the 
district court's "reasonable apprehension that [Voigt] has secreted 
certain assets," Copple II, 74 F.3d at 484, the derivation of a 
"starting point" and the concomitant shifting of the burden to the 
defendant cannot constitute an abuse of discretion. 
         To the extent that Voigt complains that the district 
court's starting point ($7,040,000) did not represent the amount of 
his actual holdings at sentencing, he misses the point.  Copple IImakes 
clear that once the district court has reasonably concluded 
that the defendant is concealing the proceeds of his crime, the 
district court may use as a starting point the entire amount of the 
loss caused minus any amount already accounted for (in this case, 
the amount sought by the government in forfeiture).  Again, we see 
no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to require 
Voigt to account for the entire $7,040,000. 
                                2. 
         The essence of Voigt's complaint is that the district 
court's ultimate restitution award was the same amount as the 
starting point it had derived.  Voigt assails the district court's 
failure to make specific findings on his ability to pay or on his 
financial resources.  But under Copple II and 18 U.S.C.  3664(d), 
it was Voigt who bore the burden of persuasion (and, logically, the 
burden of production) on whether he possessed the $7,040,000 in 
crime proceeds and on the issue of his financial resources and 
needs.  Voigt failed to adduce sufficient evidence on either 
subject.  For instance, Voigt never submitted to the Probation 
Department a completed Personal Financial Statement form.  Instead, 
he claimed that he was "living off savings and other assets," yet 
never accounted for the source of those funds.  This was simply 
insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence his 
financial resources and needs.  United States v. Cannistraro, 871 
F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion where 
restitution amount not reduced to reflect ability to pay when 
defendant fails to adduce evidence on that subject). 
         Given Voigt's complete failure to meet his statutory 
burden of demonstrating his financial resources and needs, it is 
not surprising that the district court was unable to announce 
"specific findings" on that subject.  Quite simply, because Voigt 
had failed to account for the $7,040,000 in crime proceeds, and 
because he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on his ability to 
pay and financial needs, the district court had no choice but to 
impose what had been its "starting point" as the final amount of 
restitution.  Such a result is entirely "consistent with . . . our 
policy-based conviction that defendants ought not be permitted to 
profit, quite literally, from uncertainty for which their illegal 
conduct is ultimately responsible."  Copple II, 74 F.2d at 484.  
Put another way, 
         if the government bore the burden of proving 
         that such defendants still possess illegally 
         obtained assets, the government would be 
         unable to locate hidden assets, those assets 
         would not be taken into account in framing 
         restitution orders, and the defendants would 
         continue to profit at the expense of the 
         innocent victims.  This would be 
         unconscionable. 
 
              The solution is to place the burden of 
         proof on the defendant to show what has 
         happened to all of the illegally obtained 
         assets.  All assets for which the defendant 
         cannot account may be included in the amount 
         of restitution ordered.  To the extent that 
         records are unavailable, the risk of 
         inaccuracy should be borne by the defendant 
         rather than the victims. 
 
Id. at 486 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 
         Finally, we do not view the district court's decision to 
accept Voigt's representations of indigency for purposes of 
appointing appellate counsel as mandating a contrary result.  The 
district court explained that it did so simply to expedite Voigt's 
appeal.  In United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 827 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 216 (1994), we held that a finding of 
indigence at the time of sentencing is not a bar to imposing 
restitution as long as the award is based "on realistic prospects 
that the defendant will be able to pay it, and not on fantastic or 
overly speculative possibilities."  Copple II, 74 F.3d at 485.  
Given the district court's record-supported findings that Voigt 
concealed substantial sums of crime proceeds, and given Voigt's 
failure to rebut those findings with competent evidence, the 
district court's restitution order was based on "realistic 
prospects that the defendant will be able to pay it . . ."  Id. 
                               IX. 
                    THE MOTIONS FOR SEVERANCE 
         Finally, Voigt argues that the district court erred in 
denying his motions to sever his trial from those of his 
codefendants on the ground of mutually antagonistic defenses, and 
that his convictions must therefore be reversed.  The district 
court's denial of Voigt's motion is reviewable only for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 483 (1993). 
                                A. 
         In appealing his conviction on this ground, Voigt faces 
an uphill battle.  As the Supreme Court has recently noted, 
"[t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of 
defendants who are indicted together."  Zafiro v. United States, 
506 U.S. 534, 113 S. Ct. 933, 937 (1993).  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) 
("Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same 
act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions 
constituting an offense or offenses.").  Such joint trials promote 
efficiency in the courts and serve the interests of justice by 
preventing "the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts." 
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537, 113 S. Ct. at 937 (quoting Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209, 107 S. Ct. 1701, 1708 (1987)).  In 
addition, joint trials of defendants charged under a single 
conspiracy aid the finder of fact in determining the "full extent 
of the conspiracy," United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 199 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S. Ct. 492 (1982), and 
prevent "the tactical disadvantage to the government from 
disclosure of its case."  United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967, 
973 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034, 102 S. Ct. 574 (1981). 
         As a result, when defendants have been properly joined 
pursuant to Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
"a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if 
there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury 
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence."  Zafiro, 
506 U.S. at 539, 113 S. Ct. at 938.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 ("If it 
appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a 
joinder of . . . defendants . . . for trial together, the court may 
order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance 
of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires."). 
         Many courts have recognized that such a risk arises when 
codefendants assert "mutually antagonistic" defenses.  See Zafiro, 
506 U.S. at 538, 113 S. Ct. at 937 (collecting cases).  Even where 
a defendant establishes that his defense and those of his 
codefendants are mutually antagonistic, however, severance is not 
mandatory.  Id., 113 S. Ct. at 938.  Mutually antagonistic defenses 
are not prejudicial per se; and even if they were, Rule 14 "leaves 
the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district 
court's sound discretion."  Id. at 539, 113 S. Ct. at 938.  
Therefore, to obtain a reversal of conviction for failure to sever 
where codefendants assert mutually antagonistic defenses, a 
defendant "must demonstrate clear and substantial prejudice 
resulting in a manifestly unfair trial."  United States v. 
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981).  
         Although precise articulations may differ, courts agree 
that "[m]utually exclusive defenses . . . exist when acquittal of 
one codefendant would necessarily call for the conviction of the 
other."  United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 
1991).  This type of situation arises "when one person's claim of 
innocence is predicated solely on the guilt of a co-defendant."  
United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 1993).  In 
determining whether mutually antagonistic defenses exist such that 
severance may be required, the court must ascertain whether "the 
jury could reasonably construct a sequence of events that 
accommodates the essence of all appellants' defenses."  United 
States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990).   
         While mutually antagonistic defenses have been much 
discussed in theory, only rarely have courts found that they exist 
in practice.  See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S. Ct. at 937; see 
also Tootick, 952 F.2d at 1078 (finding mutually antagonistic 
defenses warranting reversal where two defendants charged with 
assault both defended themselves by arguing that the other 
committed the assault alone).  Far more frequently, courts have 
concluded that the asserted defenses, while in conflict with one 
another, are not so irreconcilable that "[t]he jury could not have 
been able to assess the guilt or innocence of the defendants on an 
individual and independent basis."  Tootick, 952 F.2d at 1083.  
See, e.g., United States v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir. 
1994) (affirming denial of motion to sever because a jury "could 
logically" accept one defendant's defense without concluding that 
the codefendant was guilty, and vice versa); Harris, 9 F.3d at 501 
(affirming denial of motion to sever trials of coconspirators, one 
of whom claimed innocence and the other of whom claimed entrapment, 
on the ground that these defenses are not inconsistent because the 
jury could logically have accepted both); Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d at 
1548 (affirming denial of motion to sever because "the jury could 
reasonably construct a sequence of events that accommodates the 
essence of all appellants' defenses").   
         Moreover, courts have consistently held that finger- 
pointing and blame-shifting among coconspirators do not support a 
finding of mutually antagonistic defenses.  See Provenzano, 688 
F.2d at 198 (affirming denial of motion to sever where all 
defendants blamed one coconspirator on the ground that these 
defenses were not antagonistic, because if jury had believed that 
only one defendant was to blame there would have been a failure of 
proof on the conspiracy charges); see also United States v. Smith, 
44 F.3d 1259, 1266-67 (4th Cir.) (affirming denial of motion to 
sever where defendant's codefendants claimed that he ran the whole 
scheme and they were just victims of his criminal influence), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995); United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 
992 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of motion to sever where 
each coconspirator defended himself by blaming the others on the 
ground that the jury could have believed all defendants' theories 
and acquitted them all); United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d 431, 438 
(7th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of motion to sever where 
codefendants in a drug conspiracy all claimed ignorance and blamed 
each other on ground that "plain and simple blame-shifting" does 
not necessarily prevent jury from making reliable judgment about 
guilt or innocence), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1098 (1994); United 
States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 530 (3d Cir.) (holding that "the 
mere presence of hostility among defendants or the desire of one to 
exculpate himself by inculpating another" are insufficient grounds 
to require severance), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 327 
1971).  These cases illustrate the well-settled principle that 
"defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may 
have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials."  Zafiro, 504 
U.S. at 540, 113 S. Ct. at 938.   
                                B. 
         Voigt's argument is essentially indistinguishable from 
those that were rejected in the conspiracy cases cited above.  The 
basis of his claim is that his codefendants "directed blame at 
[him] as the architect of the scheme . . . ."  Smith, 44 F.3d at 
1267. Travis argued throughout the trial that Voigt had deceived 
her, and that "[s]he was one of the victims of John Voigt."  App. 
at 985 (Travis' counsel's closing argument).  Similarly, Anderskow 
and Anchors argued that they were pawns in a scheme created and 
perpetrated by John Voigt. 
         Voigt contends that "the defenses presented [by his 
codefendants] would, in order to have succeeded, have required 
defendant Voigt's conviction, and certainly enhanced that 
possibility."  Voigt's Br. at 30.  In light of the case law and on 
logical grounds, we disagree.  The basic theory behind the defenses 
of Travis, Anderskow, and Anchors was that they lacked criminal 
intent.  Although it is fairly clear that these defenses, by 
pointing the finger of blame at Voigt, increased the likelihood 
that Voigt would be convicted, the Supreme Court has stated that 
this type of injury alone does not mandate severance.  Zafiro, 506 
U.S. at 540, 113 S. Ct. at 938.  As the government correctly argued 
in its brief, "it was not logically impossible for the jury to have 
either (i) disbelieved all of the defenses, given the government's 
affirmative proof or (ii) believed all of them, on the basis that 
the government had not adduced sufficient evidence of intent."  
Government's Br. at 39.  Under these circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that the defenses in this case were mutually antagonistic. 
         The limiting instructions that the district court gave to 
the jury reinforce our conclusion.  See Smith, 44 F.3d at 1267; 
Rivera, 6 F.3d at 438.  The court instructed the jury (1) to 
"consider each count of the indictment and each defendant's 
involvement in that count separately," (2) that "the burden is 
always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt," (3) that its "verdict as to any defendant on any count 
should not control [its] verdict as to any other defendant or any 
other count," and (4) that opening statements and closing arguments 
are not evidence.  Anderskow's App. at 4251, 4257 & 4278.  We are 
convinced that these instructions "were sufficient to cure any 
potential prejudice from antagonistic defenses."  Rivera, 6 F.3d at 
438 (relying on similar instructions).  We therefore conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Voigt's 
motions for a severance. 
                                X. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         We will affirm Voigt's conspiracy, money laundering and 
tax evasion convictions, as well as the district court's order of 
restitution.  We will vacate the forfeiture order, which is 
incorporated into the judgment of conviction and sentence, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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